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This thesis will examine the issue of a fixed 
connection between Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick. 
The concept has been the focus of considerable debate at the 
national and provincial levels, and has attracted the 
attention of many people from diverse backgrounds and 
occupations from as far away as Japan. Debate over such a 
concept has waxed and waned at various times since the 
province joined the Canadian confederation in 1873.
Although the effects of such a mega-project would be most 
acutely experienced in P.E.I., the jurisdiction over the 
building and maintenance of the link would rest with the
ii
federal government. This thesis will argue that over the 
last century the fixed link has always been essentially a 
political issue. The decision to build or not to t)uild 
rested solely with Ottawa and not the provincial government 
or the people of P.E.I.
Under the terms of entry into the Canadian union, the 
federal government promised to maintain continuous year 
round communication between the Island and the mainland.
Over the years Ottawa's attempts to fulfil those terms have 
often fallen far short of what Islanders believed they 
should be. Not surprisingly, debate on better forms of 
continuous communication usually flared up around election 
times. One can therefore identify four distinct intervals 
of particularly vehement discussion, each distinguished by 
election campaign platforms and propaganda. They are as 
follows; 1885-1896, 1905-1917, 1956-1970, and 1985 to the 
present.
While this thesis does chronicle the story of the fixed 
link, it does so in a political context, and more 
particularly in the context of federal-provincial re 1 ar.ions. 
Although the people of Prince Edward Island voted in favour 
of a fixed link during a provincial plebiscite in 1989, they 
had no idea what physical form the link would ultimately 
take. After the plebiscite, a bridge design was accepted by 
the federal government, but without public consultation.
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Clearly the federal government was the key to everything 
from design to funding. Such has been the story of the 
fixed link since it was first discussed as a serious 
possibility on the 1880s, By looking at the series of 
arguments which resulted in the decision to proceed with the 
project in 1993, as well as the reasons it did not come to 
fruition in the past, this thesis provides some insight into 
how significant federal attitudes and policies are even in 
matters that focus on one particular province.
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Earl Grey (left) and Minto (right) stuck in ice somewhere in 
the Northumberland Strait cl910. In this postcard photo, 
passengers were required to make a perilous ice-walk between 
the vessels. Since some of the passengers appear to be 
walking in the direction of the Earl Grev. it seems likely 
that the vessel made an attempt to free the Minto. It is 
interesting to note that both ships were equipped with doors 
at ice level. The picture shows a ramp extended from the 
Earl Grey's ice level portal.
The New Abeawelt photographed here in 1993 at Borden,
P.E.I., was built in 1982. This modern ice-breaking vessel, 
with its large capacity for vehicles, revolutionized 
transportation across the Northumberland Strait. It 
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An original sketch of an ice-boat house at Cape Traverse, 
P.E.I., 1906. Courtesy of Joe MacDonald, Borden, P.E.I.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis will examine the issue of a fixed 
connection between Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick. 
The concept has been the focus of considerable debate at the 
national and provincial levels, and has attracted the 
attention of many people from diverse backgrounds and 
occupations, including politicians, engineers, organized 
business, the clergy, the media and academics from as far 
away as Japan. However, no one has been closer to the fixed 
link issue than the people of Prince Edward Island.
Islanders traditionally have been divided over the 
advisability of being permanently connected to mainland 
Canada by a fixed link. Debate over such a concept has 
waxed and waned at various times since the province joined 
the Canadian confederation in 1873. Although the effects of 
such a mega-project would be most acutely experienced in 
P.E.I., the jurisdiction over the building and maintenance 
of the link would rest with the federal government. This 
thesis will argue that over the last century the fixed link 
has always been essentially a political issue which rested 
solely with Ottawa and not the provincial government or the 
people of P.E.I. It was the federal authority which has had 
the power to determine whether or not a fixed link was 
politically and economically viable for Canada, and the
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power to support and to terminate such a project.
The debate on the need for and viability of a fixed 
link never completely died out at any time after 1873. This 
was largely due to the fact that under the terms of entry 
into the Canadian union, the federal government promised to 
maintain continuous year round communication between the 
Island and the mainland. Over the years Ottawa's attempts 
to fulfil those terms have often fallen far short of what 
Islanders believed they should be. Not surprisingly, debate 
on better forms of continuous communication usually flared 
up around election times. One can therefore identify four 
distinct intervals of particularly vehement discussion, each 
distinguished by election campaign platforms and propaganda. 
They are as follows: 1885-1896, 1905-1917, 1956-1970, and 
1985 to the present.
After election fever had passed, the issue of the fixed 
link was usually placed on the back burner, only to be 
revived on the eve of another election. Every time the 
topic was raised it became clear that any proposal, to 
become a reality, would have to meet certain criteria set 
out by the federal government rather than the provincial 
authorities. Meeting these criteria posed major obstacles 
and resulted in rejection and delay or alternative 
solutions. In the interim, the fixed link issue was usually 
overshadowed by other problems such as war, economic 
depression or the need for immediate improvements in the
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ferry service. Also, agitation in P.E.I. for a permanent 
link was often silenced when financial redress, in the form 
of increased subsidies, was received from Ottawa, or when 
the ferry service was actually running efficiently.
Since confederation. Prince Edward Island has grown 
increasingly dependent on federal transfer payments.
Instead of being an equal partner in the union, all to often 
the province saw no other recourse than to seek federal 
"handouts" to stimulate her lagging economy. In the 1990s 
the fixed link project represented one of the largest 
federal forms of assistance available to the economically 
depressed province. Over the years, many have argued that a 
fixed crossing would close the economic gap and place the 
Island on a more equal economic footing with the rest of 
Canada. To many Islanders, on both constitutional and moral 
grounds, the federal government owed P.E.I. a permanent 
link. Ironically, the fixed link was an example of the 
extent to which otherwise independent and proud Islanders 
looked to Ottawa to solve their economic woes. Not 
surprisingly, the project has been a source of federal- 
provincial friction. Although the fixed connection falls 
under federal jurisdiction, federal and provincial 
administrations historically have had problems reaching 
agreement on things like funding, design and maintenance. 
This, in turn, has often strained federal-provincial 
relations at a time when harmony between the two was most
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needed to foster economic growth.
Although the people of Prince Edward Island voted in 
favour of a fixed link during a provincial plebiscite in 
1989, they had no idea what physical form the link would 
ultimately take. After the plebiscite, a bridge design was 
accepted by the federal government, but without public 
consultation. Clearly the federal government was the key to 
everything from design to funding. Such has been the story 
of the fixed link since it was first discussed as a serious 
possibility in the 1880s. By looking at the series of 
arguments which resulted in the decision to proceed with the 
project in 1993, as well as at the reasons it did not come 
to fruition in the past, one can gain some appreciation of 
how significant federal attitudes and policies are even in 
matters that focus on one particular province. While this 
thesis does chronicle the story of the fixed link, it does 
so in a political context, and more particularly in the 
context of federal-provincial relations. What the Island 
wants may not be judged as suitable in the eyes of Ottawa. 
But when it is determined by Ottawa to be good for Ottawa, 




The concept of a permanent connection between Prince 
Edward Island and the mainland was first introduced in the 
Senate of Canada in 1885, by Senator George William Howlan, 
himself an "Islander." He suggested that a metallic tube, 
or subway, be assembled on land and then laid on the floor 
of the Northumberland Strait.^ Howlan dismissed the bridge 
and tunnel concepts because the former would have interfered 
with ship navigation, and the latter was too costly, since 
it would require digging underneath the Strait, and would 
place the project outside of what he called practical 
politics.* He believed that a subway was the only feasible 
alternative since it could be ->uilt, in his estimate, for 
two million dollars.* A permanent connection, he argued, 
would enhance the Island's fresh fish, shell fish and 
agricultural industries, by enabling the products to be 
shipped to their markets more reliably and efficiently year 
round. At the same time the subway would fulfil the terms 
of union reached in 1873 between P.E.I. and the Dominion, 
which required that Ottawa ensure year round communication 
between the Island and mainland Canada.* As Howlan had 
expected, his concept was treated with indifference by his 
colleagues in the Senate, largely because the cost would far 
exceed what was deemed financially feasible at that time.® 
The following year, much more serious consideration was
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given to the subway scheme after Earl Granville, Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, responded to a joint address to 
the Queen from the Legislative Council and House of Assembly 
of Prince Edward Island. The Island government had appealed 
to the Crown for redress of grievances because of its belief 
that Ottawa was failing to provide adequate year round 
steamship service for the conveyance of mails, passengers 
and freight, as stipulated in the communications clause of 
the British North America Act. The economic misfortunes of 
the province were attributed to the Dominion's failure to 
fulfil this term of confederation. However, as far as 
Ottawa was concerned, the continuous communication 
requirement only applied to the conveyance of mails and 
passengers. It did not include guarantees for the transport 
of freight.® Hence, year round steamer service was not 
necessary as long as there was some alternative way to 
transport mail and passengers during the winter months when 
it was hard to keep a steamer in service. Herein lay the 
root of decades of debate. Ottawa gave the clause a 
narrower, less costly interpretation. Islanders gave it the 
broadest and thus more costly interpretation.
In his letter of 1886 to the Marquis of Landsdowne, the 
Governor General of Canada, Granville, while not taking 
sides, expressed doubts as to whether year round steamship 
service couJd be maintained across the Northumberland 
Strait.7 Given the nature of the winter conditions in the
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Strait, he believed that was not a reasonable expectation. 
Consequently, he suggested that if year round service was 
needed, perhaps the idea of a "'metallic subway' should 
receive a full, and if feasible, favourable consideration on 
the part of the Government of the Dominion."® The details 
of Granville's despatch revealed that Britain did not want 
to take sides in the argument, but to merely act as 
adjudicator and facilitator. The response from the 
Secretary of State represented a significant dimension in 
federal-provincial relations within the young Dominion. 
Clearly Islanders could no longer count on Britain to settle 
their grievances, they had to deal with the federal 
government of Canada instead. The fate of P.E.I. rested 
with the ability of its government to convince the federal 
government to formulate favourable policies and to support 
desired projects.
Granville's despatch was subjected to various 
interpretations in the Prince Edward Island House of 
Assembly. It was viewed by some members as a strong 
recommendation to proceed with the subway project, since it 
was obviously impossible to carry out to the letter the 
terms of the communications clause under existing 
conditions.® Others were not so sure. Most agreed, 
however, that if steamers were found to be incapable of 
providing continuous communication, then it was the federal 
government's responsibility to find and provide a feasible
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and more dependable means of crossing the Strait." Thus, 
it was generally agreed that the provincial government 
should insist that the terms of confederation be carried out 
by the Dominion government, either through better steam 
navigation service or some other means, such as a subway.
If Ottawa failed to fulfil its constitutional contract, then 
the province should be entitled to compensation.^^ So went 
the debate.
Throughout the debate many argued that secure 
continuous communication would give Islanders the ability to 
move people and goods at any time, which in turn, would 
rejuvenate the Island economy, attract new industry, 
increase property values and make the people as prosperous 
as in former times." A subway, for example, was seen as 
being of great benefit to the farmers. It would enable them 
to ship their potatoes and produce to market more quickly 
and reliably, and thus allow them to obtain a more 
competitive price for their commodities." Island trade 
would no longer be impaired because of an unreliable and 
restrictive seasonal steamship service. For instance, the 
first vessel deployed by Ottawa for the Northumberland 
Strait service, the Northern Light, was not designed for the 
harsh ice conditions experienced in the Strait." A 
second-hand wooden river steamer, it was often laid up or 
stuck in the ice for extended periods. In 1887-88 it made 
only 21 round trips in the winter season.
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Also, many complaints were registered about the poor 
conditions for passenger travel on board the early steamers. 
In spite of Ottawa's claims that the flow of traffic and the 
number of passengers using the service did not warrant a 
large expenditure to improve conditions, Island politicians 
believed that cost should not be an issue when it came to 
fulfilling a solemn and binding contract.^® In fact, 
government members argued that more people would use the 
service if it was dependable and safe
A permanent connection was also seen as being 
advantageous to Prince Edward Islanders because it would 
give them immediate and direct access to the Intercolonial 
Railway, and hence the Canadian interior. It would allow 
them greater opportunity to share in the benefits of federal 
public works projects, to which their tax dollars 
contributed." In fact, some observed that a subway would 
provide P.E.I. with its own great federally funded public 
works project, at a cost that would be modest when compared 
to the federal government's expenditure on the Canadian 
Pacific Railway, the completion of which was a condition of 
British Columbia's entry into confederation."
In the 1880s, the proposal for the construction of a 
subway across 14 km of open water was a unique and untried 
scheme.^® Criticism of the scheme were therefore 
predictable. Opponents argued that because there was no 
similar project in the world and that the durability had
10
never been proven, the Dominion government would be ill 
advised to give it the go-ahead.Critics also questioned 
the ultimate cost. Since Senator Howlan's initial proposal, 
the estimate had escalated to five million dollars.“
Others raised concerns about the obstacles and risks caused 
by the extreme winter and spring environmental conditions. 
Peter Sinclair, for instance, talked about the variations in 
climate, the frequency of storms in the Strait, and the 
perils of board ice and its effect on a metal structure."
Critical voices were outnumbered by those who favoured 
pressuring Ottawa to take some kind of steps to provide 
guaranteed year round service for mail, passengers and 
freight. The construction of a subway was viewed by some 
members as nothing less than Ottawa's duty, and that it was 
P.E.I,'s right to have a permanent link.” Those in favour 
of a permanent connection believed that if a subway proved 
to be impracticable, a tunnel ceitainly was not an 
impossibility.” They argued that technological advances 
in tunnel construction and boring excavations would 
virtually overcome any obstacle and greatly reduce the 
c o s t T h e r e f o r e ,  it was resolved in the provincial House 
of Assembly that "the government did not admit that it was 
impossible to build a tunnel..."” The provincial 
government petitioned the Dominion government to give 
serious consideration to building a subway or tunnel. It 
was up to Ottawa to act.
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Ottawa acknowledged the validity of the complaints 
about existing steamer service. Nevertheless, it was still 
not enthusiastic about the subway plan and it was not 
willing to risk federal monies on such a project. However, 
Ottawa did offer a possible alternative and at the end of 
1886, the Northumberland Straits Tunnel Railwav Comoanv Act 
was passed, creating a private company to promote tunnel 
construction.:? This was evidence that Ottawa had some 
faith in the tunnel idea. It was also evidence that Ottawa 
was not going to invest too much of the Canadian taxpayer's 
money in the project. Money seemed to govern Ottawa's 
position regarding a fixed link. The company was granted 
ten years in which to complete the work, after which it 
would have the option to lease or sell to the federal 
government.
From the beginning Ottawa laid down the ground rules. 
It could accept or reject. It could start and it could 
terminate. It could pay or not pay. Islanders could only 
repeatedly ask. For example, one of the stipulations of 
incorporation was that the contractor would be responsible 
for making and submitting all surveys to the federal 
government engineer.** If they were deemed inadequate, 
Ottawa could stop the project. The private company would 
also be expected to pay all of the costs, which included 
land damages.*® It could raise revenue from tolls and a 
federal government subsidy.** In this way, Ottawa claimed
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any losses to the federal government would be minimal if the 
project f a i l e d . I n  response to Ottawa's proposal, 
various prominent engineers, including Vernon Smith and 
Walter Shanly, expressed interest in designing a permanent 
crossing and submitting estimates. According to statements 
made in the Senate and the P.E.I. House of Assembly, one 
group of investors was even prepared to invest five million 
dollars in building a subway, as well as constructing 
railway branch lines to a number of communities, as long as 
the investors received a subsidy from the federal 
government.”
Meanwhile, many Islanders questioned the federal 
government's sincerity. Perhaps Ottawa was, in reality, 
shelving the idea of a fixed link in the guise of promoting 
a tunnel plan that it knew would never be realized.
Certainly members of the P.E.I. Legislative Council observed 
that the bill incorporating the Tunnel Railway Co. did not 
set out any specifics about a tunnel, such as the size, form 
and grade.^ Since being connected to the Intercolonial 
was one of the primary reasons for favouring a fixed 
crossing, members also expressed concern that there was no 
clause to ensure that a tunnel was, in fact, large enough 
for rail traffic to pass t h ro u g h . S u r e l y  if Ottawa was 
serious such considerations would have been acknowledged.
Others were not sure the tunnel was a better option to 
a subway. They spoke instead of a bridge c o n c e p t . T h e y
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wanted to know why Ottawa had not considered the bridge 
alternative. The advantage of a bridge, they argued, was 
that a part of it could be repaired when it broke away, and 
it would not collapse like a tunnel.^ The railway bridge 
in Halifax across the harbour, completed in 1885, the first 
steel swing bridge built entirely in Canada, was used as an 
example to justify that a bridge could be built across the 
Northumberland Strait at a reasonable cost.^® As well, the 
Legislative Council expressed the view that before a work of 
such magnitude was undertaken, "the Government should have 
ascertained what amount of subsidy would be efficient to 
induce a Company to construct and operate, for a term of 
years, a Bridge or subway that would afford ample facilities 
for traffic."3® And, if Ottawa was so concerned about cost 
and really wanted the best deal, why had it not requested 
submission of figures showing the comparative cost of 
constructing and operating a tunnel, bridge or subway?*®
By 1887, John A. Macdonald was uncertain about his 
chances for electoral success. His western immigration 
program was not as successful as he had hoped. His refusal 
to commute the sentence of Louis Riel had acerbated French- 
English relations and Nova Scotia was talking of leaving 
confederation. Macdonald needed all the votes he could get, 
including those in Prince Edward Island where in June 1886, 
the Conservative Premier, W.W. Sullivan, had won his third 
consecutive election. Not surprisingly, Macdonald deemed it
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was politically wise to reassure Islanders that he was 
concerned about the issue of guaranteed communication. So 
on the eve of the federal election, Macdonald informed 
Senator George Howlan that his government would give serious 
consideration to the problems of traversing the 
Northumberland Strait. Obviously the Northumberland Straits 
Tunnel Railway Company had been viewed initially as little 
more than a political sop. But with votes at stake, the 
federal government was willing to take another look.
In his letter to Howlan, Macdonald expressed the 
government's interest in making further examinations of the 
Strait. Although he emphasized that cost was an all 
important factor in determining the fate of the project, he 
trusted, "that the report will be such as to justify the 
Government in entertaining the p r o j e c t . M a c d o n a l d  was a 
well seasoned astute political campaigner. His judgement 
was dead on. In Prince Edward Island, the Conservatives, 
including Howlan, interpreted Macdonald's letter as a very 
positive sign that the federal government would proceed with 
the fixed link project, if the Tories were re-elected to 
office. The Liberals, of course, claimed it was nothing 
more than campaign propaganda/" But the die was set. In 
Charlottetown, the Daily Examiner reminded voters that the 
federal election, was a time for the people of P.E.I. to 
decide which party was more likely to serve the interests of 
the province." The implication was that the party
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favouring a link was the one with Island interests at heart.
Macdonald and his Conservatives were returned to power 
in 1887, but no thanks to P.E.I. voters. All six MPs 
elected were Liberals. Islanders were not impressed with 
Macdonald's past reticence to fulfil the terms of the 
communication clause. They sent a message of disapproval 
but Macdonald was not concerned, he was returned to office 
anyway.
Macdonald had not received Islanders' support and they 
would not get his. Island MPs continued to press the 
federal government for a permanent connection but to no 
avail. For instance, in the House of Commons, Stanislaus 
Perry asked Macdonald if it was the intention of the 
government to survey the Strait in order to carry out the 
First Minister's promise to build a subway to P.E.I.** Now 
free of the campaign trail, Macdonald responded, "It is not 
the intention of the government to cause a survey to be 
made, with a view to building a subway across the 
straits."*® Perry noted that the Island was not receiving 
justice on the issue because six opposition members were 
sent to Ottawa.*® In one of his letters, George Howlan 
expressed his belief that the subway or tunnel would have 
been entirely completed, if the Island had sent even two 
members in support of John A. Macdonald's government.*’
Such were the realities of political patronage.
Nevertheless, Ottawa could not openly breach the
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clauses of the constitution. Guaranteed communication for 
mail and passengers could be facilitated within the limits 
of engineering and financial feasibilities. The federal 
government therefore decided to put a new steel ice-breaking 
steamer, the S.S. Stanley, into service in 1888.‘*® It was 
later joined by the S.S. Minto in 1899. The new vessel was 
a desirable option for the federal government because it was 
an economical alternative to any multi-million dollar fixed 
link project. The initial success of the steel steamer 
temporarily displaced the fixed connection debate.^" In 
the winter of 1888-89 the Stanley made 79 round trips, 
almost four times that of the Northern Light during the 
previous year.
But the success was short lived. The following year 
conditions in the Strait proved to be too much for the 
Stanley. Because of heavy pack ice, the ship was often 
stranded. The Islanders only means of communication with 
the mainland was by making the dangerous crossing by ice 
boat or sled. George Howlan, who continued to pursue the 
tunnel idea until his death in 1901, used this opportunity 
to once again promote a tunnel plan. Howlan was well aware 
that another federal election was likely in March 1891. To 
lend substance to his arguments, he consulted Sir Douglas 
Fox, an eminent British engineer, who indicated that six 
million dollars was sufficient to build the t u n n e l . I n  
light of delayed ferry service and Howlan's revised figures,
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Ottawa politicians promised once again to give the proposal 
favourable consideration.“
The election came and went, and the Conservatives 
regained power. This time P.E.I. elected two Conservative 
candidates. In return, the re-elected '^ory government hired 
two private companies to undertake surveys and borings in 
the summers of 1894 and 1895 to ascertain the nature and 
viability of a link." But the machinery of government 
moved slowly, particularly as the Conservatives were in a 
constant state of chaos following the death of Macdonald 
shortly after the election and the escalation of the 
Manitoba Schools Crisis. In Prince Edward Island these 
surveys were regarded as nothing more than stalling 
tactics." Islanders received even less encouragement when 
Wilfrid Laurier and his Liberals came to power in 1896. The 
issue was dropped. Laurier believed it was not economically 
viable for Canada, especially after several years of world 
wide depression." He had more pressing problems to solve.
So too did the Islanders who now added to their list of 
grievances a reduction in the number of MP's from six to 
five, because of a drop in population.
Federal indecision and apathy concerning improvements 
in communication were a source of agitation in P.E.I. 
throughout the last two decades of the nineteenth century. 
There was even talk of secession expressed by Island members 
in the Commons. As one member blatantly put it, "there is
18
not a man in Prince Edward Island who would not jump at the 
offer and be glad to get free of the shackles imposed on us 
by the Dominion Government."” Because it was obvious the 
federal government's interest in a fixed link generally 
waned shortly after general elections, Islanders accused 
Ottawa of using the fixed connection issue as a political 
instrument solely in order to win votes.” Islanders felt 
betrayed and used. Their representatives had not demanded a 
permanent connection, they had simply asked the federal 
government to fulfil the terms of its constitutional 
contract by finding a means of communication that was better 
than what existed. If steamer service could be rendered 
more reliable that was fine. If not, then, at the least, 
Ottawa should conduct serious feasibility studies to 
determine if such alternatives as a subway, tunnel or bridge 
were viable--economically and technically.” As one Island 
Member of the House of Commons observed in 1892 :
...If the cost of such a tunnel is too much, in 
Heaven's name let us know it. I do not want to be 
urging year after year a scheme which is not 
practicable. Let the Government say that it is not, and 
let us drop the matter forever. But I object to their 
keeping this dangling before the people, to their 
making promises which are not kept and which are made 
only to be broken, but which are made before every 
election...”
What Islanders regarded as a constitutional right 
became a kind of political carrot dangled before them at 
election time by Conservatives and Liberals alike. The
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provincial politicians promised to pursue the issue in 
Ottawa and the federal politicians promised to resolve it if 
certain conditions were met. Ironically, at various times, 
both Liberals and Conservatives accused each other of trying 
to impede the project.” The federal government did not 
recognize a permanent connection as being necessary to 
fulfil the confederation agreement.” So at the end of the 
nineteenth century, the concept of a fixed link was nothing 
more than an idea, one that would never get beyond the 
cerebral stage until a federal government was convinced that 
it was a constitutional obligation, an economic possibility 
and above all, a political necessity.
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The hiatus in the fixed link debate came to an end in 
1905.1 The steamship service continued to be unreliable.
The S.S. Stanley and S.S. Minto simply could not cope with 
pack ice. In 1903 both were stranded in ice. This was the 
source of renewed agitation. The trade losses, the 
depreciation in farm stock, the danger of ice-boat travel 
and the irregularity of mail service all combined to produce 
a great deal of discontent among Islanders and renewed 
interest in a fixed connection.® A convention was therefore 
called in 1905 to discuss the issue.
Representatives from across Prince Edward Island m̂ »* in 
Charlottetown on March 10th. Among them was the Rev. A.E. 
Burke of Alberton P.E.I. He was a friend of Senator Howlan 
and a believer in a tunnel concept.® The first point 
resolved by the gathering was that both provincial and 
federal governments must be lobbied to ensure that the full 
terms of the Island's entry into confederation were 
realized. The provincial government was requested, "to urge 
incessantly on the federal government, the absolute 
necessity of implementing the terras of confederation."* It 
was also resolved that claims for redress for non fulfilment 
would be served annually upon Ottawa.®
The principal resolution of the meeting dealt with the 
ideas of a tunnel, a subject on which Burke had spoken with
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enthusiasm and conviction. He argued that the farmers 
especially needed the tunnel to better facilitate their 
marketing of potatoes.® He also revealed that a private 
contractor from Toronto, M.J. Haney, had indicated he could 
build the tunnel for $10 million.’ So it was resolved that, 
"... this meeting call upon the federal government to fulfil 
the said terms of union forthwith by causing such a Tunnel 
to be constructed at the earliest possible moment."® Until 
such a tunnel was built, the convention requested that 
Ottawa provide a third powerful ice-breaking steamer to help 
provide more dependable winter time service across the 
Strait.®
The resolutions of the Charlottetown meeting were 
intended to be directed to the federal government, not only 
by the provincial government, but also by a committee named 
at the meeting. It was to proceed to Ottawa to lobby for a 
tunnel."" The delegation, including Father Burke, was 
accompanied by Island senators and the four members of 
Parliament (3 Conservatives and 1 Liberal). It was received 
by the Liberal Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier and his 
Finance Minister on April 1, 1905." The delegates 
presented their case in the form of a memorandum which 
elaborated on the resolutions passed by the Charlottetown 
convention. They indicated that a tunnel would eliminate 
the large Prince Edward Island Railway deficit; it would 
also enhance profits on the Intercolonial Railway, alter
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public utility values and eliminate the telegraph monopoly. 
The delegates further claimed the tunnel would improve 
Island trade, agriculture and commerce by significantly 
reducing freight rates, and that it would double or even 
triple the population and prosperity of P.E.I."
The delegates must have been convincing, at least 
enough not to be shown the door. Laurier responded to their 
requests with a promise to take the matter into 
consideration." In addition, the Island delegation 
received a favourable response from the Canadian media."
The members succeeded in stirring up interest where there 
was once apathy, and directed national attention to the 
communication contract." For the first time, the tunnel 
received a degree of public support from outside of P.E.I.
As Father Burke observed, the idea of a tunnel had seized 
upon the imagination of the people of Canada."
In order to keep up the momentum begun by the first 
delegation, Premier Arthur Peters announced on May 8th, 1905 
that he would head up a delegation to Ottawa to press the 
issue further." Interestingly enough, this delegation had 
the support of the business community from the Nova Scotia 
Board of trade, the Toronto Board of Trade, and the Canadian 
Manufacturer's Association." Although the media and 
organized business supported a tunnel and had the power to 
influence public opinion, the fate of the project really 
rested with the federal government. Even a sympathetic and
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favourable business community in central Canada could not 
bring the project to fruition. It was up to Ottawa to 
determine whether or not it was an affordable, justifiable, 
realistic and sound investment for Canada as a whole.
While in Ottawa, the provincial delegation pointed out 
to officials that there had been no improvement in the 
reliability and quality of service across the Strait since 
1901, and that unnecessary delays in crossing were 
frequent." Delegates claimed that economic stagnation 
among the commercial classes and outmigration could be 
directly attributed to the inadequate transportation 
infrastructure. They drew attention to a resolution passed 
recently by the provincial legislature that claimed that it 
was not possible to foster a competitive manufacturing 
industry that required the importation of raw materials and 
the exportation of manufactured goods, without dependable 
year round access to the mainland, the railways, and 
markets." The ordinary social and business affairs of the 
province were also hampered by inefficient communication, 
thus discouraging businesses from locating in P.E.I.'^ The 
Premier and the delegates received much the same response as 
had the earlier delegation. The federal government agreed 
to order an enquiry into the feasibility of the tunnel 
project, whose projected costs increased with every year 
that passed. Ottawa also agreed to place a new ice-breaking 
ferry on the Northumberland Strait run.**
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A particularly harsh winter in 1906 increased the 
discontent with existing transportation facilities in P.E.I. 
Steamship service had actually ceased for several 
consecutive days. A solemn promise had been broken and 
consequently inter-provincial trade had been interrupted." 
Ottawa's Minister of Marine and Fisheries stated in the 
Commons that it was an exceptional circumstance that both 
vessels were stuck in the ice.*^ Islanders were not 
convinced. Such mishaps, in fact, were not infrequent. In 
1905 the Minto was stuck in the ice at Panmure Island, and 
the Stanley was stranded in port at Pietou. Nova Scotia, 
both for several days." On September 29, 1906 the 
Charlottetown Guardian stated that winter service has always 
been inadequate, and that a tunnel was the only solution." 
This Island daily also reiterated the need for the promised 
new steamer in the interim and was emphatic in its remarks 
about the breaches of faith on the part of the federal 
government."
That Islanders were not satisfied with their treatment 
by the federal government was made evident in parliament. 
Throughout 1906 threats of withdrawing from confederation 
were repeatedly voiced. A local Conservative MP went so far 
as to say that P.E.I. was on the verge of secession and 
would not tolerate the situation much longer." Another 
member claimed that if the unfair treatment persisted.
Prince Edward Island would wave the flag of secession in the
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same manner as British Columbia had when completion of the 
Canadian Pacific Railway was in d o u b t . T h e  Guardian, 
similarly began an editorial campaign calling for reliable 
year round communication or separation from the union.
Just as George Howlan had argued in the 1880s and 
1890s, so in the 1900s Island MPs argued that provincial 
trade and business suffered because freight imports and 
exports were too often tied up on either side of the Strait 
because of breakdowns in communication.^^ For instance, 
they observed, it was not uncommon for hay and other goods 
to perish in unprotected storage, thereby threatening the 
cattle population with starvation, and adversely affecting 
P.E.I.'s agriculture-based e c o n o m y T h e  importance of 
inter-provincial trade had increased since confederation, 
especially under the National Policy, and the Island could 
be placed at a competitive disadvantage. The inability to 
guarantee deliveries did just that. Two ageing ships were 
simply incapable of handling the growing amount of freight 
even during the non winter months.”
Shortly after the Island joined confederation, the 
federal government implemented the National Policy of tariff 
protection in 1878. This policy made it less attractive for 
P.E.I. to trade with its traditional trading partner, the 
United States. As a result of the National Policy and 
changes in the global economy. Island markets had, since 
1878, become directed increasingly inland toward central
29
Canada. Islanders now had to compete with central Canadian 
interests. Speaking about the impact of confederation and 
federal trade policy on the Prince Edward Island economy, 
one Island MP claimed that prior to confederation the tiny 
colony had traded largely with the United States, Britain 
and the West Indies. Trade with Canada had been small in 
comparison.’* After confederation, however, this pattern 
was reversed and Canada became the primary market for Island 
products, but it was a highly competitive and volatile one 
because Ontario and Quebec produced many of the same 
agrarian and fish products.’®
Also, according to the Island representatives, P.E.I. 
trade with Britain had declined after confederation because 
subsidized steamers sailing from major central Canadian 
ports, like Toronto and Montreal, could undercut the rates 
of the unsubsidized sailing ships sent to Europe by Island 
merchants. Consequently, products that before confederation 
had come directly to the province, were now coming in 
through other Canadian ports like Halifax and Montreal 
before going to P.E.I.’® This made imported goods more 
expensive on the Island and made it more expensive to ship 
out export goods. In 1907, a Member in the House quoted an 
editorial that had appeared in the Guardian which stated 
that, "... Canada having gained access to our market and 
fenced it in with tariff walls, has turned her back upon us 
to exploit the west."” The people of Prince Edward Island
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wanted a better deal than what they had received up until 
that point at the hands of federal decision making. They 
believed that they had as much right to economic stimulation 
and year round transportation services as the people in 
western Canada. For many Islanders, the tunnel scheme had 
emerged as the kind of federally funded infrastructure that 
was necessary for Islanders to compete successfully with 
their counterparts on the mainland.^®
The tunnel project became the primary issue of 1907 as 
far as provincial and federal politicians were concerned." 
Islanders were still waiting for the long promised new ferry 
and tunnel survey. Island Members of Parliament repeatedly 
attempted to obtain satisfaction from Ottawa with respect to 
the broken promises of the past. Wilfrid Laurier was 
criticized for appearing sympathetic with P.E.I. before an 
election, and evading the tunnel issue once the election was 
over.*” The Island population was frustrated with the 
manner in which one federal administration after another 
would make promises about the tunnel and then shelve the 
plan after coming to power. Islanders were further incensed 
when Laurier replied that he would not be bullied or pushed 
faster than he deemed circumstances warranted/" He was 
also supported in his position by the report of government 
engineers who estimated tunnel construction costs in the $15 
million range." One had even reported that the project was 
too great a financial and engineering risk." Laurier was
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not convinced by those who used the examples of other 
tunnels in the world, such as the Hudson River tunnel, and a 
Swiss tunnel, as proof of viability."
Laurier could procrastinate and others could outrightly 
reject Island claims and requests, but the issue did not 
die. Island politicians proved to be a tenacious lot and 
they reworded, reworked and restated the same old arguments 
throughout 1907. A tunnel was seen as a way to 
revolutionize industry in P.E.I., solve the problem of 
outmigration, and maximize the utilization of Island 
resources." Some even believed that it would double the 
population and, as Father Burke had once argued, make P.E.I. 
a much more valuable asset to the country." The complaints 
made by the business, agricultural and fishing communities 
centred around the disadvantages of the "three haul" 
transportation system. Their livelihood depended on 
products reaching the markets in a saleable condition. 
Because of the trip across the Northumberland Strait, 
shipments from stations on the Prince Edward Island Railway 
to stations on the Intercolonial Railway and from points on 
the Intercolonial to the Island railway were subject to 
three short hauls and increased freight rates, winter and 
summer.*’ Freight movements across the Strait also required 
two extra handlings because the Island railway was of a 
different gauge than that of the Intercolonial." Goods 
deteriorated in transit because of the additional handling.
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the slow and irregular movements of the steamers and the 
unpredictable delays due to heavy ice conditions/* A 
tunnel, it was claimed, would eliminate these delays and the 
three short hauls by providing for only one continuous 
haul/® Also, being permanently connected to the 
Intercolonial Railway would ensure that all Islanders, as 
well as the merchants, would share in the same economic 
benefits and reduced rates as the rest of Canada.
The year 1906 turned out to be an election year. As in 
the elections of 1887, 1891 and 1896, politicians on all 
sides latched on to the fixed link theme. The Charlottetown 
Examiner stated the obvious, "... the people of P.E.I should 
send four representatives to oppose the present government 
which broke its promise and to support Mr.Borden."" In 
fact, Conservative leader Robert Borden, a Maritimer 
himself, used the issue as a political instrument to 
criticize the Liberals. He suggested that the government 
should set out immediately to determine whether continuous 
communication was possible or not, and then make a decision 
on the tunnel." Election rhetoric was clearly in the air 
for Laurier, who previously had denied that the federal 
government was obligated to provide a fixed connection or 
even a new steamer, responded, "We should provide the tunnel 
if it can be done with anything like reasonable 
expenditure."" Borden grandly promised that if elected he 
would authorize a tunnel study to determine if it was the
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best way to eliminate the three short hauls system.^
Having seen this pattern of electoral support and post 
election disinterest before, Islanders were not naive. They 
were aware of what motivated this sudden interest in the 
tunnel. The twelve year old Liberal government might talk 
of national unity and Canadian economic growth, but its 
leader knew his politically biased distribution of patronage 
over the years had tarnished his party's image. The 
recently elected Tory leader, Borden, promised a new age, a 
system of national telegraphs and telephones and a "new 
national policy" to foster trade within Canada and the 
British Empire. Islanders recognized that the support 
coming from both parties was being used for political effect 
rather than being offered as a solution to a long standing 
problem and breeching of a constitutional c o n t r a c t . T h e  
political value of the issue obscured the Island's real 
transportation needs.
Nevertheless, the election propaganda seemed to 
contradict previous federal government announcements.
Claims were made that the cost of tunnelling had decreased 
in recent years because of new technology, and thus the 
tunnel was probably not beyond the resources of Canada to 
entertain the idea.®* However, it was noted that there was 
no extant tunnel that was comparable in distance and size to 
the one proposed for the Northumberland Strait. In order to 
permit rail traffic to get through, new and expensive
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blasting techniques would be required. In light of this, 
the Liberals were cautious in how they worded their support 
for studying the scheme. After all, as Liberals maintained, 
it was the fault of Nature that heavy pack ice filled the 
Strait in the winter, it was not the fault of government.
The Liberals could not be expected to rectify the wrongs of 
nature, unless, of course, it was politically expedient, 
technologically possible and economically viable to do so.®'' 
Whatever resentments and cynical opinions Islanders may 
have harboured with respect to Laurier's government, they 
did not convince Islanders to return Tory candidates as they 
had in 1904. Instead, on October 26, 1908, three out of 
four members were elected to sit on the benches of the 
narrowly re-elected Liberal government. Perhaps frustration 
with the ineffective efforts of the former three Tory MPs 
had convinced Islanders to shift their allegiance, even if 
only by a very slim majority. Maybe it was because voters 
hoped that returning government members might ensure a more 
sympathetic hearing. Perhaps it was the Liberal promise of 
free rural mail delivery or the Catholic rejection of the 
Tories because of an anti-Catholic piece of Conservative 
propaganda, The Duty of the Hour.®® Whatever the reason, 
three Liberal MPs were sent to Ottawa to represent the 
interests of all Islanders. Shortly thereafter, in 1909, a 
new ice-breaking steamship, the Earl Grev. arrived in 
Charlottetown to replace the Stanley, now twenty years old.
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The provincial Liberal government of Arthur Peters 
certainly was pleased with this new ship but it did not 
provide an answer to the problem of permanent year round 
contact with the mainland, Peters, like most Islanders, 
still felt aggrieved that Ottawa refused to acknowledge its 
obligations under the terms of confederation. Strapped 
financially, P.E.I. needed something to jump start its 
lagging economy. Peters believed that the solution lay in a 
fixed link. It would not only help importing and exporting 
interests but might also promote an emerging tourist 
industry. If Ottawa would not undertake the tunnel project 
then it would have to pay for its breech of contract some 
other way. Peters, therefore, asked the federal government 
for subsidy increases, as had many Maritime premiers before 
him. There was little response. The tunnel issue also 
seemed to die. After all, Ottawa reasoned, a new steamer was 
in place.
In the federal election of September 21, 1911, 
discussion of the fixed communication link received 
relatively little attention. As in the past, the same 
arguments were raised and the same requests made. The 
Liberals made no promises, while the Conservatives only went 
so far as to promise an improved ferry service. Borden 
acknowledged the need for another vessel. More pressing 
issues at the national level included the Liberal calls for 
reciprocity with the United States and Liberal plans to
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create a Canadian navy. Islanders were split on these 
issues and consequently elected two Liberals and two Tories. 
Nationally the Liberals went down to defeat and Robert 
Borden found himself in power.
Islanders had not forgotten Borden's past comments of 
support for the tunnel cause and requests for another 
vessel. The new Prime Minister, while not anxious to pursue 
the tunnel idea, which now seemed financially unrealistic as 
an option, agreed to study the need for another ship. In 
1912, he hired Professor A.K. Kirkpatrick to review the 
existing route followed by ships to traverse the 
Northumberland Strait. It had been suggested that perhaps 
one of the problems of maintaining continuous service was 
the route used. The hired consultant agreed. The existing 
route between P.E.I. and Pictou, N.S. was long and 
complicated by tides and currents. Instead, a route was 
selected that closely paralleled that used by the mail 
delivery ice boats, running between Cape Traverse, P.E.I. 
and New Brunswick.
The new route between Cape Tormentine, N.B. and 
Carleton Point (later called Borden) was selected because it 
represented the shortest distance between the Island and the 
mainland, and was the route of least resistance in the 
winter months. Also, according to the engineers, both 
shorelines had adequate space and topography for new wharves 
and were functional under virtually all weather conditions.
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It was also the safest navigable route.®® The government of 
Robert Borden liked the idea of providing better shipping 
service rather than embarking on any of the more exotic, 
untried and expensive fixed link alternatives. Islanders 
wanted, at least, to get something for their efforts. 
Construction work began on the piers at the terminals in 
1913.®° Since the Island railway was a narrow gauge railway 
at the time, a short piece of both standard and narrow gauge 
line was built near the slip on the Island side so that 
freight could be transshipped more efficiently.*^
A new route and new docking facilities and wider 
railway gauge lines were certainly major steps forward in 
addressing the need for better transportation service to 
P.E.I. A new ship was also launched in 1914." The Prince 
Edward Island first took up its duties on the Pictou- 
Charlottetown route. This was an up-to-date, well equipped 
ice-breaking vessel and had the capacity to carry twelve 
Intercolonial railway cars." Ironically, this increase in 
ferry capacity did not last long, as the Earl Grev and Minto 
were sold to Russia during the first World War.
The arrival of the modern rail capacity vessel 
precipitated an administrative change in the ferry service. 
In 1914, the federal government transferred control over all 
aspects of the service, which included terminal management, 
from the Department of Marine to the Department of Railways 
and Canals. Hence, the ferry service became the
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responsibility of the Intercolonial and Prince Edward Island 
Railway. Subsequently in 1923, the service came under the 
jurisdiction of Canadian National Railways, a Crown 
corporation created by the federal government in 1919.
In 1905, Islanders had appeared as a united front 
demanding better ferry service, redress of broken promises, 
and a serious consideration of a fixed link scheme.
Political responses to any of these demands seemed to gain 
momentum just as election time rolled around, as in 1908 and 
1911. In fact, the pattern of response paralleled the 
reactions to the very same requests in the closing decades 
of the 19th century. Nothing had changed. It was just as 
clear in the second period of fixed link activity as it had 
been in the first that Island pressure would never form a 
large enough lobby to force Ottawa to act. Not even media 
support or national business support would do it. As well, 
between 1891 and 1911 the number of Island MPs had dropped 
from six to four. Island representatives were certainly 
little more than voices crying in the wilderness. If P.E.I. 
wanted to get a fixed link, Ottawa would have to be 
convinced of its need to act on the basis of safety, 
constitutional obligation and political expediency. So it 
was that as in the past a new ferry now and again was sent 
to replace an ageing one. At least there was some hope in 
1914 that communication would be better in the future. 
Examples of Ottawa's response included the selection of a
39
better ferry route, the construction of wharves at the 
piers, and a change in ferry administration.
In 1917, steamers were replaced by an ice-breaking car 
ferry. Within three years, as Island trade expanded, the 
service was used to its fullest. Successful marketing 
depended on the ability to guarantee delivery. The economy 
was too vulnerable when dependent on one ferry, especially 
when in 1919 there was talk of using an Island ice-breaker 
to assist in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.
Following the First World War the Maritime region, 
including P.E.I., failed to experience any post-war economic 
rejuvenation. In an attempt to seek redress of regional 
grievances, the Maritime Rights Movement emerged in 1919.
One of the issues included that of transportation across the 
Northumberland Strait. Federal transportation policies, in 
general, were sources of regional complaint. Maritime 
businesses protested against high freight rates, inadequate 
subsidies and declining representation in the House of 
Commons. They exploited the prevalent sense that the region 
had not shared fully in the promised benefits of 
confederation. Among the three Maritime provinces, P.E.I. 
was the least active in the Movement. This largely could be 
attributed to the fact that the Movement was the brainchild 
of business and manufacturing interests such as the Chamber 
of Commerce. However, agricultural interests also found 
their niche in the movement. The Island was primarily an
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agrarian economy. Her farmers' main complaint was the state 
of the ferry service. Supporters of the Maritime Rights 
Movement therefore added the need for a second railway car 
ferry facility and the replacement of P.E.I.'s narrow gauge 
railways to their list of grievances and demands.®*
The federal election of 1925 saw the demands of the 
Maritime Rights Movement given front page attention in the 
region. However, MacKenzie King gave little more than lip 
service to these demands. Maritimers responded and returned 
mostly Conservatives in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and 
two Conservatives out of four seats in Prince Edward Island. 
The Liberals seemed to have ignored the results of the 
Maritime Economic Conference held in Moncton earlier that 
year. Called by the Maritime Board of Trade, various 
committees were set up to study issues like industrial 
development. When the committees reported in Charlottetown 
on November 4-5, one of the recommendations called for 
improved communication to P.E.I.®®
MacKenzie King recognized that something needed to be 
done to appease the Maritimes. Thus, he appointed a Royal 
Commission on Maritime Claims. The Commission was headed by 
Andrew Rae Duncan, whose job it was to study Maritime 
complaints and the economic grievances of the region in 
general. Its final report of 1926 confirmed the opinion of 
the Maritime Economic Conference. The Duncan Commission 
reported that improved rail and ferry service were essential
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to P.E.I.'S future economic well being. While many of the 
Duncan Report recommendations were never acted upon, King 
did agree to order another ferry. The specially built S.S. 
Charlottetown was launched on the Borden-Cape Tormentine run 
in 1931. Her gross tonnage was more than twice that of her 
predecessor, the Prince. Edward Island. She had the capacity 
to carry sixteen railway cars, 800 passengers, and a full 
deck load of cars.®® Ottawa seemed to have been convinced 
of the need for dependable, strong, and railway compatible 
ferries, especially since the country was in the midst of 
the Depression, and there was no money for mega-projects.
Unfortunately, the S.S. Charlottetown's life was short. 
In 1941 she sank on her way to a routine inspection in Saint 
John, N.B. The old Prince Edward Island was called back 
into service. Due to war time conditions she was not 
replaced until after World War II. But war time was not the 
occasion to pressure Ottawa for improved ferry service or a 
fixed link, so the whole question of guaranteed year round 
communication between P.E.I. and the mainland remained in 
limbo until the 1950s. Nevertheless, while political 
discussion of a possible fixed connection ceased, there were 
those who were still fascinated by the engineering 
challenges of building a nine mile link. Quietly engineers 
looked at new ideas. The tunnel idea was pretty much 
dropped because of rapidly escalating costs. In its place 
was growing faith in building a combination bridge and
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causeway< When the political and economic environments were 
right, the issue of building a fixed link would resurface as 
surely as night followed day.
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The fixed connection debate resurfaced in 1956 and 
gained momentum in the late 1950s and 1960s. As in the 
previous two periods of fixed link discussion, the federal 
government made promises during the election campaigns. But 
as in the case of the tunnel plan, the causeway scheme was 
used by politicians and their parties to achieve their own 
political ends. Ironically, it was federal political 
circumstances that finally launched commencement of the 
causeway in real terms in 1956. It was federal concerns 
that halted it in 1969 in favour of an improved ferry 
service and an economic policy known as the Prince Edward 
Island Development Plan. In the first instance it was a 
Conservative decision and, in the second, a Liberal 
decision.
The causeway scheme which engineers began to favour in 
the early 1950s involved a break-water style roadway that 
would entail the placement of massive quantities of land 
fill in the Strait. The completion of the Canso causeway in 
1955 between Cape Breton Island and the Nova Scotia mainland 
served as an example that such a structure was possible. In 
any event, the causeway concept temporarily replaced the 
tunnel idea of the pre-1914 period. Even though some 
preliminary plans were available to show that a causeway 
between New Brunswick and P.E.I. was theoretically possible,
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there was no evidence to indicate the economic and 
technological feasibility of such a project.
Although the physical nature of the fixed link proposal 
had changed since 1914, the arguments supporting a fixed 
connection had not. As in the days of Senator Howlan, 
constitutional obligation and economic expediency were 
recurring themes among the proponents of a causeway. In 
1956, Neil A. Matheson, a Tory MP from Queens, P.E.I., first 
raised in the House of Commons the idea of constructing a 
causeway. As had been argued in the past, Matheson claimed 
that a causeway would put an end to the delays associated 
with the ferry service and thus assure continuous 
communication as guaranteed in the confederation pact.^ He 
argued that the interest from the existing annual operating 
deficit of the ferry service would finance causeway 
construction.2 Although Matheson's arguments did not 
generate much debate in the Commons at this time, he was 
successful in obtaining a certain amount of support. Other 
members took notice of the Island's isolated position within 
the larger federation. The causeway idea, however, did not 
get mu"^ national media attention until almost a decade 
later.
Meanwhile, in Prince Edward Island, support for a 
causeway was growing within the local Liberal government's 
ranks. Premier Alexander Matheson firmly believed that the 
causeway would solve the Island's economic woes and give the
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100,000 people of P.E.I. a greater chance to share more 
equally in the profits of mainland trade and commerce. His 
government observed that the existing ferry service 
consisting of the old but functional Prince Edward Island 
and the much larger, modern ice-breaking Abecrweit, was 
unable to handle the ever increasing traffic on the New 
Brunswick to P.E.I. route. Much of this increased traffic 
was due to the growth in the tourist industry. By 1956, it 
was the third most important economic activity on the 
Island. As tourist traffic increased, pressure on the ferry 
service in the peak season far exceeded the fixed capacity 
of the year round service. The government was convinced 
that a convenient and efficient means of cross-Strait 
transportation was absolutely vital to the future of the 
Island's economy.^
So it was that on March 6, 1956, a resolution was 
tabled in the P.E.I. House of Assembly endorsing a proposal 
for construction of a causeway. The resolution was passed 
unanimously. Since construction required federal approval 
and funding, the resolution requested that the federal 
government, "...take steps to find out if there is fill 
available for such a causeway in the vicinity of Cape 
Tormentine."* It was further resolved that the Government 
of Canada be requested to begin the construction of a 
causeway at the earliest possible moment, pending an inquiry 
into the availability of land fill.^
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It is interesting to note that the Island government 
obviously did not give any serious consideration to an 
alternative to the causeway scheme, There was no suggestion 
in the resolution that should the necessary landfill not be 
available that the federal government should then increase 
the number of ferries and improve wharfing facilities.® 
Perhaps, proponents of the causeway feared that any 
suggestion of an alternative might undercut the strength of 
the causeway proposal. More likely, this was because the 
proponents were caught up in the economic philosophy of the 
day. Whether in British Columbia, Ontario or Newfoundland, 
economic advisors in the mid 1950s had become firm believers 
in the employment and marketing advantages of mega-project 
developments. These included everything from hydro power 
schemes to transcontinental highway projects. Mega-project 
thinking had become part and parcel of the Island 
government's approach to economic development. For this 
reason the federal government was not offered an 
alternative. As far as Matheson was concerned, the Island 
needed a causeway and it was up to Ottawa to build and 
service one.
In spite of Prince Edward Island's position, Ottawa did 
not interpret the request as an obligation to proceed with 
the project. It simply viewed the resolution as a request 
to study the feasibility of the proposal.’ With an 
election in the offing it might be wise to show some
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interest in the proposal. Consequently, in the spring of 
1956, Ottawa agreed to conduct feasibility tests for one 
year to examine rock formations at Cape Tormentine and to 
make a thorough economic analysis and benefit study of the 
causeway versus the ferry service. According to the 
Minister of Public Works, Robert H. Winters, himself a 
Maritimer, the feasibility of causeway construction would 
depend largely on the availability of a suitable rock 
supply.® Therefore that spring, the Department of Public 
Works commenced exploratory drilling in the Cape Tormentine 
and Westmorland County areas in order to determine the 
quality and quantity of desirable rock.®
While work at the test holes was slow and costly, the 
Island'8 provincial government received an endorsement of 
its resolution from another source.“ In June 1955, Louis 
St. Laurent had appointed a Royal Commission on Canada's 
Economic Prospects, chaired by Walter L. Gordon. A lifelong 
Liberal and highly respected accountant and industrial 
consultant, Gordon was an economic nationalist. He feared 
that the branch plant system that was absorbing Canadian 
companies would turn Canada into an economic outport of the 
United States. He was anxious to see the development of a 
Canadian controlled economy, one supported by better 
infrastructure and marketing approaches. Not surprisingly, 
when the first report was released in February, 1957, a 
certain amount of attention was focused on the Atlantic
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Provinces, perceived as the peripheral members o£ 
confederation. The commission suggested that Ottawa might 
have to consider offering financial incentives to encourage 
unemployed Maritimers to move to jobs in central and western 
Canada. While this proposal may have contributed in part to 
the rejection of the Liberal party in the election of June 
10, 1957, for Islanders there was a more palatable 
recommendation. This was the one calling for replacement of 
the ferry service with a causeway. Gordon suggested that 
such a permanent link would bolster the Island's annual $5 
million tourist industry and also that of New Brunswick and 
Nova Scotia." A causeway would make unpopular delays and 
congestion at the ferry terminals during the tourist season 
things of the past.
Following the 1957 federal election that saw John 
Diefenbaker and the Progressive Conservatives squeak into 
the government benches for the first time since 1935, 
interest in the Island causeway did not die. Heath 
MacQuarrie, a popular Tory MP who represented the 
constituency which included Borden, the Island ferry 
terminus, argued early in 1959 that the loyal and 
hardworking Prince Edward Island and Abecrweit simply could 
not cope with the summer vehicular traffic." Something 
had to be done and he believed a causeway was a viable 
alternative.
In an attempt to return his Liberals to power in the
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provincial election of 1959, Premier A.W. Matheson, as had 
other premier's before him, used the fixed link platform. 
Like other parts of Canada by the late 1950s, Prince Edward 
Island was caught in the recession into which the country 
had slid shortly after the federal elections of 1957 and 
1958 (the latter had given Diefenbaker a massive majority). 
The boom period of the early 1950s had come to an abrupt 
halt. Unemployment was at a post war high, and business 
capital investment had dropped dramatically, as had consumer 
demand. Matheson therefore argued that construction of a 
causeway would create temporary jobs, keep young Islanders 
at home, raise the population of the Maritime region, and 
establish a local market for P.E.I.'s manufacturing and 
primary producers.“ But Matheson believed the causeway 
was more than a make work project. It was also seen as a 
way to eliminate the escalating maintenance costs and 
operating expenses of the vessels."' After all, Matheson 
claimed, by building the causeway Ottawa would save one 
million annually, excluding toll revenues."
Meanwhile, practical Islanders realized that a causeway 
was a long way off. In the immediate future the existing 
ferry service would have to be upgraded. In a report of the 
Select Standing Committee on Transportation and 
Communication, submitted to the Island Legislature on April 
11, 1958, several proposals were offered regarding the 
ferries. The committee recognized the impact of the
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increase in car and transport traffic, and while strongly 
recommending the immediate completion of the surveys to 
determine the feasibility of a causeway, it also recommended 
that the provincial governments of P.E.I. and New Brunswick 
press Ottawa to add a new ferry:
Visualizing the great impetus that this Causeway will 
have to the general economy of the Maritimes, and to 
the economy of Prince Edward Island in particular, we 
feel perfectly justified requesting the Government of 
Canada to fulfil the agreement set forth in the British 
North America Act i.e. continuous communication with 
the mainland. Fully realizing the long period of time 
necessary for the completion of this project, also that 
one of the present boats has been in service over a 
period of forty years; also aware, that a serious 
accident could disable either of the two boats 
presently in service, with resulting disaster to the 
economy of the Province.. We strongly urge the 
Government of Canada to procure and put into immediate 
service another boat equivalent to the carrying 
capacity of the M.V. Abegweit."
The committee also noted that the new vessel--the M.V. 
Lord Selkirk, expected to begin running between Wood 
Islands, P.E.I. and Caribou, N.S. on May 1st, 1958, would 
help alleviate some of the traffic congestion and make the 
Nova Scotia markets more accessible, particularly to Island 
farmers.
Matheson lost the election in 1959 to the Tories, which 
became known as "party of the c a u s e w a y . I f  nothing 
else, the time had come for a change. Islanders had been 
governed by Liberals since 1919 with the exceptions of 1923- 
1927 and 1931-35. But a change in government did not lessen
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the provincial government's efforts to convince Ottawa to 
undertake construction of the causeway. On the contrary, 
Conservative leader Walter R. Shaw supported the idea and 
firmly believed he had a sympathetic political ally in John 
Diefenbaker. After all, in 1958, Diefenbaker's government 
had voted $360,000 to examine the feasibility of a causeway 
and had continued to fund the study.
Shaw also began to promote a new angle in the causeway 
argument. He urged Ottawa to give serious consideration to 
the causeway as a way to reduce dependence on federal 
largesse. Federal members for the Island latched on to the 
apparent reasonableness of this line of argument. In 1960, 
Heath MacQuarrie observed that 56% of the province's 
revenues were obtained through direct grants from Ottawa.*® 
The Island was rapidly becoming a welfare client state. By 
giving P.E.I. access to the same resources and benefits as 
the mainland, Islanders would be better able to exploit 
their economic potential. Although the traditional 
arguments for a fixed link at mid century were, in the eyes 
of Islanders, as valid as they had been in the past, the 
fate of the project rested with the political objectives of 
the federal party in power. Since Ottawa was anxious to 
reduce regional disparity and promote economic growth, the 
economic independence position seemed to be a good one.
In Ottawa support for the causeway had begun to gain a 
little momentum in the election of March 31, 1958. Having
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only a minority government, Diefenbaker was anxious to 
gather as many seats into the Conservative fold as possible. 
After all, he did not expect to win many in Quebec. Louis 
St. Laurent had resigned as Liberal leadet in January of 
that year, leaving the campaign to Lester B. Pearson. The 
Liberals quickly charged the Tories with making election 
promises designed to mislead Islanders, Hazen Argue, member 
from Assiniboia, stated that in 1957, "the people of the 
Island were led to believe by the Conservative party that 
they had a program which would result in the building of a 
c a u s e w a y . I t  was all mere window dressing and election 
rhetoric. The Tories were not deterred. On election day, 
1958, they announced plans to undertake a feasibility 
engineering study for the causeway plan."
In the years immediately following cnat'announcementj 
politics kept the debate alive although the causeway itself 
remained little more than a pipe dream. Island politicians 
and proponents continued to push for a causeway as a 
solution to their many transportation problems acerbated by 
a rapidly changing economic environment and increasing 
emphasis on shipping goods by transport trucks."
Proponents continued to argue that the project would boost 
local industries including agriculture, fishing and tourism, 
while eliminating the operating deficit of the ferry service 
and fulfilling the terms of confederation.
Not everyone, of course, favoured the construction of a
56
fixed crossing. Many Islanders were concerned about 
preserving their unique and distinct mode of life. Since 
the late 19th century, opponents of the fixed link concept 
had not been particularly vocal or well organized. Perhaps 
this was because no one really believed the fixed connection 
was a viable project and therefore not a serious 
possibility. Through the years opponents tended to focus 
attention on the need for better ferry service and found 
themselves in the same ranks as those who favoured a fixed 
connection first, and ferries until the link was built. 
Opposition came from many quarters in the 1950s and 1960s, 
but was quite fragmented. Many of the opponents may have 
been discouraged from going public with their views because 
they were often ridiculed as being opponents of progress. 
Frank MacKinnon's statement is an example of the ridicule 
the opponents had to endure. The prominent Island academic 
referred to the opponents as "wags" who, "...lampooned the 
project, suggesting that when it was finished New Brunswick 
would become a fourth county of Prince Edward Island; or, on 
the other hand, that if the fill for the causeway was to be 
taken from Prince Edward Island, there would soon be no 
Island left and New Brunswick would have the longest wharf 
in the world!" *
Vocal opposition to federal intervention in Island 
affairs did not receive much media attention until 1973, 
when an organization known as the Brothers and Sisters of
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Cornelius Howatt was formed to promote Island interests at 
the time of Prince Edward Island's centennial year 
celebrations. Like their anti-confederate namesake, the 
Brothers and Sisters sought to protect Island identity from 
the intrusion of outsiders crossing the "fixed link." As 
far as opposition to a fixed link was concerned, however, 
the opponents did not have a great deal of lobbying power 
until 1987, when they organized into a group known as the 
"Friends of the Island," which was a late spin-off of the 
Brothers and Sisters. The unsuccessful efforts of the 
latter to stop the project is strong evidence that Ottawa 
was going to make a decision that was politically expedient, 
in spite of whether opposition was organized or not.
Nevertheless, in Ottawa in the latter part of the 
1950s, the causeway scheme was increasingly overshadowed by 
alternative plans to improve the ferry service. The 
causeway engineering report ordered by Diefenbaker in 1958 
was pending.However, the need for immediate 
improvements in communication, particularly with the ice 
breaking service, gave the ferry issue precedence over that 
of the causeway. Tourism and export demands kept the system 
under constant pressure. The fleet was unable to cope in 
the summer months. One thing was sure, the federal 
government was not going to finance both improved ferry 
service and construction of the causeway. In 1959, Walter 
Shaw submitted a brief to the Royal Commission on
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Transportation, chaired by Murdock A. MacPherson, in which 
the Island government recommended that Ottawa purchase a new 
rail and car ferry for the Northumberland Strait Crossing to 
New Brunswick.“
Island representatives in Ottawa also suggested that 
the federal government should consider placing the 
Vacationland. the ferry then used on the Mackinac, U.S.A., 
run before the opening of the MacKinac Straits bridge, be 
transferred to the Borden-Cape Tormentine run.®’ The 
Minister of Transport, George Hees, however, did not believe 
the Vacationland was a suitable vessel because of the 
considerable expense that would be incurred in transforming 
it into a ferry safe for the kind of passenger and vehicular 
traffic it would be expected to carry." Another member 
argued that the $3 million purchase price, even with a $2 
million alteration fee, would be less than the $8 million 
price tag for a new ferry, and it would enable Islanders to 
see an immediate improvement in transportation across the 
Strait, without delay." Anxious to provide a quick remedy 
for P.E.I.'s communication ills, the federal ir^^rnment 
agreed, and in mid-1959 it announced plans tu ç^rchase the 
Vacationland and the Holiday Island. It also announced that 
a new car ferry, to be operated by Canadian Pacific Rail, 
would be ready for 1961." But, announcements were one 
thing, reality another. In fact, the Vacationland and 
did not begin service on the Borden-
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Tormentine run until 1971."
Technology in the late 1950s was transforming the 
transportation industry. The introduction of refrigerated 
rail cars represented a turning point in the movement of 
perishable products. Reefer (refrigeration) units were 
tested by Canadian National Railways in the winter of 
1959." It was anticipated that the new reefer cars would 
be able to carry more Island potatoes, reduce transportation 
costs and expand markets." Also, the change from gas 
engines to diesel helped expand the viability of the 
trucking industry, so much so that by the late 1960s 
trucking would surpass rail as the preferred mode of export- 
import transportation." Paradoxically, technological 
advancements placed further demands on the ferry service.
For instance, as the use of transport trucks expanded, so 
did the need for more efficient year-round communication 
with the mainland. The ice-breaking service could not keep 
up with the demands of the additional traffic. Some of the 
vessels were designed for summer service only and had 
limited space for trucks. So it was in 1961, that the 
provincial government declared that, "existing boat 
facilities are neither adequate or dependable for year round 
service."^® New vessels and docking facilities were needed. 
Preferably, for some, a causeway should be built. After 
all, they maintained, it was the most practical and 
economical alternative."
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As in the past, federal interest and expenditure of 
time addressing the issue of continuous communication abated 
after election time. Election promises gave way to the 
economic realities of office. For example, a short time 
after the P.E.I. election in 1959, the Minister of Public 
Works, D.J. Walker, indicated that there were many 
unforeseen obstacles in the way of building a causeway. He 
stressed that it would be difficult to undertake the project 
because of tremendous problems with regard to cost.^’ 
According to the Minister, federally funded engineering and 
cost research revealed that the price tag for a causeway 
would be much higher than original estimates.^® The fact 
that the causeway was shunned by Ottawa after an election 
proved to many Islanders that the fixed link was nothing 
more than an election carrot waved before the eyes of voters 
to advance the cause of those seeking office. The extent to 
which the causeway was little more than a political issue in 
the eyes of Ottawa was summed up by the member from 
Gloucester, H.J. Robichaud, when he stated in the House of 
Commons that "it is amazing to realize that such objections 
(to the causeway) could come into existence only after the 
provincial election..."”
The causeway project received the support of two 
influential New Brunswick businessmen, K.C. Irving and 
Michael W arden. They had convinced New Brunswick Premier 
Hugh John Flemming, as well as Matheson when he was in
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power, that the causeway should be part of a three pronged 
concept that included the building of the Chignecto Canal 
from the Bay of Fundy to the Northumberland Strait, and a 
208 mile corridor road from Quebec to New Brunswick, passing 
through northern Maine. These three transportation links 
would generate industrial expansion at a remarkable rate, 
they claimed.
Irving's dream was reinforced by the rhetoric of the 
Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (APEC), an independent 
non-partisan body that had been formed in 1954. Its job was 
to study and define economic weaknesses and needs of the 
Atlantic region. In the late 1950s, APEC had identified 
transportation as one of the most urgent needs. The 
building of a causeway to P.E.I. fitted in perfectly with 
its recommendations. So it was that engineers produced 
blueprints for yet another fixed link. This time the plan 
called for a two and a half mile long causeway starting at 
Jourimain Island, N.B. It would join to a three mile bridge 
followed by a one and a half mile causeway, and a one mile 
long ramp ending at Borden, P.E.I. In 1960 the estimated 
cost was in the vicinity of $148 million."
Support for this proposal came from Louis Robichaud, 
the new premier of New Brunswick in 1960. At a federal- 
provincial fiscal conference in July of that year, Robichaud 
joined Premier Walter Shaw of P.E.I. in voicing the 
recommendation of Dr. Alexander K. Cairncross, who had just
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completed an analysis of Atlantic regional economic needs. 
Cairncross had urged the construction of a causeway.
Cairncross's recommendation was reiterated the next 
year in the report of the MacPherson Royal Commission on 
Transportation. It stressed that the region needed a more 
integrated transportation system to encourage the movement 
of manufactured goods from the region. One of the keys was 
a permanent crossing joining P.E.I. and the mainland.
Although the early 1960s did not bode well for 
federally-funded expensive mega-projects, the industrial 
development arguments coincided with the policies of the 
federal government of the day. Recognizing that regional 
disparity actually affected the whole national economy, 
Ottawa decided to act upon the advice of APEC, which had 
called for the creation of a body empowered to directly 
advise the federal government as to what kinds of investment 
would best assist the Atlantic region in combatting regional 
disparity. The result was that Prime Minister John 
Diefenbaker announced the appointment of the Atlantic 
Development Board (ADB) in December, 1962. In April of that 
year, he had also announced that his government would indeed 
build the long dreamed of causeway.
The ADB was conceived as a federal agency mandated to 
advise Ottawa as to how best to encourage capital investment 
in the public and private sectors of the Atlantic region. 
Diefenbaker's government had been unable to pull the country
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out of the recession that had marked the end of the 1950s.
In the throes of an austerity program that was neither 
particularly popular nor successful, Diefenbaker called an 
election for June 18, 1962. He knew that he was unlikely to 
repeat the great electoral sweep of 1958. Tory strategists 
planned a campaign around the theme of National Development 
and Programs for the Future. Meanwhile, the Liberals, now 
led by Lester Pearson, smelled possible victory in light of 
the Conservatives failure to restore the country to economic 
health. The time had come for revival of the fixed link 
issue in election rhetoric directed at Prince Edward Island 
and New Brunswick electors.
During an electioneering campaign sweep across the 
Maritime provinces, John Diefenbaker promised that the 
federal government would build the causeway at an estimated 
cost of $100 million/" The proposed 14 km mega-project, 
he said, would be constructed across the Northumberland 
Strait from Borden, P.E.I. to Cape Tormentine, N.B., 
following approximately the same route as the ferry service. 
The Prime Minister based his support on the report of a 
consulting firm, Northumberland Consultants Ltd., who had 
conducted the feasibility and design studies. The report 
stated that it would take at least five years to complete 
the work." And although a consortium made up of H.G.
Acres and Company Limited, Canadian British Engineering 
Consultants, and Langevin, Letendre, Monti and Associates
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was interested in building the causeway, it had not yet had 
time to analyze the extreme ice conditions in the Strait on 
a causeway. Ottawa was confident it could be built. It 
was, after all, an election year and Diefenbaker grandly 
declared that the project was feasible/"
Islanders showed their approval by sending four 
Conservatives to Ottawa. Promises of a causeway might win 
votes in P.E.I., but Diefenbaker needed far more than the 
handful of votes there to win re-election. Canadians were 
not happy with his government and when the votes were 
tallied, the Conservatives emerged with only a minority 
government. The success of Real Caouette and his Social 
Credit Party in Quebec had denied the Liberals victory. 
Faced with a continuing monetary crisis, Diefenbaker 
announced deep expenditure cuts to reduce the national 
deficit. But his minority government was doomed to face 
another election on April 8, 1963. Even though Pearson was 
then elected to power with only a minority government, the 
causeway was kept alive by Island proponents in the wake of 
the 1963 election. P.E.I. voters had elected two Liberals 
to sit in Pearson's government. Nevertheless, they hoped a 
minority government might be a bit more receptive after an 
election than a majority government, as in 1958.
Meanwhile Diefenbaker, interested in maintaining and 
regaining support in eastern Canada, continued to press the 
causeway plan in Ottawa. He stated in the House of Commons
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on July 11, 1963, that "...the people of Canada as a whole 
accept the principle that there shall be equality of 
opportunity everywhere within our country. This project 
will pay national dividends and strengthen the bonds of our 
c o u n t r y . T h e  minority Liberal government also realized 
the importance of keeping its support in the Maritimes, and 
could no longer afford to keep silent on the causeway. The 
project was given a place of national significance--a key to 
national unity and economic growth. The project, however, 
was still not any closer to becoming reality than it was in 
the 19th century.
Island MPs began to agitate in Ottawa for a more 
definitive statement on the government's plans for improving 
transportation from the mainland to P.E.I.'*® Heath 
MacQuarrie stressed that the fixed connection was now 
possible because of improvements in technology and 
engineering skills.*® In the Senate, Island representative 
F. Elsie Inman tried to convince her colleagues that the 
fact that plans to proceed with construction of a tunnel 
under the English Channel between England and France had 
been announced recently, proved that a causeway to New 
Brunswick was not an engineering impossibility. After all, 
the tunnel would be three times the length of the proposed 
causeway.*’
Others argued in the House of Commons that once the 
causeway was completed it would be able to sustain a much
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greater volume of traffic than the existing ferry system, 
and would eliminate costly delays." Thus, the tourism 
industry would benefit from an increase in the number of 
people visiting P.E.I. The Minister of Public Works, R.W. 
Prittie (Burnaby-Richmond), tried to suppress Island 
members' enthusiasm for a fixed connection by saying that 
the influx of vehicles using a causeway would destroy the 
charm and uniqueness of the Island, MacQuarrie quickly 
responded, "... I would not like the minister to entertain 
any suggestion that he is protecting Prince Edward Island's 
culture by not moving forward as rapidly as possible with 
the causeway.
Confronted by the realities of a Liberal government in 
Ottawa, the Conservative government of Walter Shaw chose to 
concentrate on the argument that P.E.I. needed improved 
communication service in whatever form Ottawa saw fit. Shaw 
was enough of a realist to know that the causeway plan might 
very well continue to remain in election limbo. So his 
government emphasized the more immediate need for another 
ice-breaker that could cope with the heavy winter and spring 
pack ice that all too often cut the Island off from the 
mainland. Here he had some success, as Ottawa later agreed 
in 1965 to contract for the construction of a new ice- 
breaking ferry capable of carrying cars, trains, and one 
thousand passengers." But everything seemed to move at a 
snail's pace and the new John Hamilton Gray did not go into
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service until 1969.
Although a new ferry was promised, some Islanders still 
wanted a causeway and looked forward to the benefits of 
being permanently connected to the mainland. In addition to 
the traditional arguments that a fixed connection would 
relieve traffic congestion and provide continuous (24 hour) 
access to mainland markets, the supporters of the causeway 
in P.E.I., which included the Charlottetown Board of Trade, 
believed that it would provide the Island with closer 
cultural and social ties with mainstream Canadian life, 
remove the psychological barrier of being on an Island, 
create many jobs and usher in a period of economic 
activity.“ The truckers spoke of the personal pay 
increases they would receive because of the removal of dead 
waiting time/" The causeway was also seen by its 
proponents as a means of transporting hydro-electric power 
to the Island, thereby reducing the costs of importing 
electricity in P.E.I., since it had no significant power 
source of its own."
The critics of the project argued that easy access to 
the province would damage the tranquillity and charm of 
Island life and turn it into a kind of Coney Island tourist 
h a v e n . S o m e  viewed a permanent link to the mainland as a 
selling off of their Island birthright. Others argued that 
it could have a negative effect on tourism, because the 
Island's distinctive characteristics, such as the laid-back
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way oE life and charming rural beauty, would be lost.®®
And, although the provincial government had used tourism as 
a reason to support the link, the P.E.I. Tourist Association 
claimed that a fixed crossing would destroy the Island's 
individuality and unique sense of identity, and would make 
it less attractive as a tourist destination spot.®* The 
Charlottetown Guardian editor noted in 1965 that Islanders 
did not want the green fields and red soil to be tarnished 
by hotdog stands and jukebox joints.®’ Some argued that 
the ferry ride itself was a tourist attraction. Others 
feared for the future of small local industries. They 
believed that a fixed connection would allow New Brunswick 
and Nova Scotia firms to truck their products in-bound more 
efficiently and undercut the small number of secondary 
industries in the province.®*
Although Diefenbaker had been defeated, the new Liberal 
government did not disband the Atlantic Development Board. 
Instead, it expanded its mandate from that of a purely 
advisory body to that of a financial distribution body. 
Membership had increased from five to eleven, and the ADB 
was given $100 million to finance and assist in financing 
projects deemed most likely to accelerate economic 
development.
From the beginning the ADB, like APEC, designated the 
principal areas for targeted financing as power production 
and transportation. So it was that the tackling of regional
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disparity and the providing of better transportation links 
in the Atlantic region seemed to point clearly to the 
construction of a strait crossing. Not surprisingly then, 
Lester Pearson agreed to support the causeway plan. It 
would be good for political reasons and hopefully for 
economic ones as well. If APEC, ADB and Irving were right, 
the fixed link would allow P.E.I. to participate more 
directly in the industrial development of the Atlantic 
Centre area that encompassed the communities of Moncton and 
Sackville in New Brunswick, Amherst and Springhill in Nova 
Scotia and Summerside and Charlottetown in P.E.I.
With an election once again in the offing for November 
1965, the fixed link issue reappeared on the front pages of 
Island newspapers. While the federal government had been 
busy with unifying the Armed Forces, introducing the Maple 
Leaf Flag, promoting a national health care scheme and 
tackling the issue of official bilingualism, behind the 
scenes engineers had been working on plans for a 
Northumberland Strait causeway. On July 5, 1965, Prime 
Minister Pearson revealed that engineers had rejected the 
former breakwater style causeway in favour of the 
combination fixed link consisting of a causeway, bridge, and 
tunnel.®® As Pearson indicated, the revised design, which 
Irving and Wardell advocated, would permit vessels to pass 
more freely through the Strait, and would not restrict water 
and ice flow. A solid causeway would also adversely effect
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fish stocks in the Northumberland Strait.
Another issue was a factor in the causeway argument. 
Many believed that rail transportation was doomed, 
particularly on the Island. It was unclear whether the 
federal government would build a causeway with rails. A 
federal member for Queens County in 1964, commented, "...X 
know of course, as everybody knows, that there is a trend 
toward the abandonment of railway lines."®® It was 
suggested that alternate road construction would replace 
rail service." Because statements were made by the 
Solicitor General that consideration was being given to 
constructing a causeway without rails, there was 
apprehension among Island representatives about the social 
and economic impacts that rail abandonment would have on 
P.E.I. Islanders did not want to relinquish the railway, as 
it would result in profound changes to the provincial 
economy." Approximately 75% of the Island's agricultural 
exports were shipped by rail.®® Although some argued that 
$30-40 million could be saved if the causeway did not 
include rails, Pearson recognized Island concerns. The 
federal fixed connection plan included a rail track. 
Notwithstanding this fact, Ottawa showed an interest in 
getting out of the rail business. The federal government 
proceeded to downsize the service in P.E.I. over a number of 
years, until it was abolished in 1989.
Lester Pearson promised in July 1965, that tenders
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would be called that year for the first phase of 
construction which was scheduled to begin in April, 1966, on 
the New Brunswick side. It is hard to pinpoint what factor 
finally convinced the federal government to go ahead with 
the project, especially since Canada was experiencing a 
period of economic recession. Perhaps it was that very 
recession. A mega-project would create employment at a time 
when private sector jobs in construction were disappearing. 
It seems likely that Pearson went ahead with the causeway 
because it was a politically expedient move, a good make- 
work project. After all, it fitted nicely with his concept 
of national unity, "One Canada" unified.
The estimated cost of construction was $148 million and 
was to be completed over a five year period.“ According 
to various engineers, the project would be of unparalleled 
complexity. There was in the world no crossing over a 
comparable distance, where tides, weather, and ice 
conditions were so extreme.®*
A private company called Island Development Co., headed 
by Arthur D. Margison, offered to raise the funds to build a 
causeway in return for the federal subsidy spent on the 
ferry service, as well as toll revenues.*’ This proposal 
to privatize the project was not accepted by the federal 
government because privatization was not a part of its 
political agenda. The Minister of Mines, J. Watson 
MacNaught, stated that a government could not place a
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project of such magnitude in the hands of private 
interests.*® The federal government would build, operate 
and maintain the link. The maintenance costs alone were 
estimated to be $900,000 annually.®® This cost was to be 
borne by Ottawa, and toll charges were not to exceed ferry 
rates.’® By using as many Canadian materials and as much 
local labour as possible, the feaeral government intended to 
sell the link scheme as a national project.
In spite of the fact that the federal government 
decided to begin construction, federal-provincial relations 
with the Island seemed strained. The Conservative premier 
of P.E.I., Walter Shaw, was annoyed that he was not informed 
of the federal Liberal government's decision to call 
tenders, before it was announced by Pearson.’̂ Shaw 
believed that joint announcements should be made by both the 
federal and provincial governments regarding projects that 
affected both levels of administration.’̂ It appeared as 
though Ottawa was willing to go ahead with the project, 
without consulting Island officials or the public, in order 
to be perceived as the initiator and sole promoter of the 
project. Shaw, after all, also wanted to get some political 
mileage out of the program.
The federal election of November 8, 1965 was the last 
for John Diefenbaker, "the Old Chief." Just two years 
before Canada's centennial, there was emerging a general 
sense of economic n  vival coupled with concerns about
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national unity. Pearson promised continued growth as 
exemplified in the promise to undertake the P.E.I. causeway 
mega-project. Canadians appeared to be little interested in 
changing the government and the Liberals increased their 
seats by two.
This time in the wake of the federal election, the 
government that had promised to build the causeway pushed 
ahead appearing to fulfil its promise. Pearson was not 
deterred by any opposition. He indicated that ferry workers 
who opposed the plan because they feared for their jobs need 
not worry. Ottawa would assist in retraining them for jobs 
on the causeway under a special federal-provincial Technical 
and Vocational Training Agreement.” To those who 
questioned the government's sincerity of commitment, Pearson 
pointed to Ottawa's call for tenders.
On November, 1965, MacNaught turned the sod on the New 
Brunswick side of the causeway approach. Premier Robichaud 
harboured some fears that the causeway might negatively 
affect his province's tourism industry, but he also was a 
vocal supporter of inter-provincial co-operation and trade, 
even physical union of the Maritime Provinces into one 
province. He could not really oppose the plan. His Island 
counterpart, Walter Shaw, had no such doubts.
The person who did was the federal Finance Minister, 
Mitchell Sharp. Although the provinces were to assume the 
cost of building the approaches to the causeway. Sharp was,
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within just a few months of the sod turning, fearful that 
the costs to Ottawa were already escalating. In March 1966, 
Sharp announced that projected construction dates would have 
to be rescheduled. Shaw was very upset. Robichaud was not. 
Irving was. By the spring of Centennial year, rumours were 
widespread that the future of the project was very much in 
jeopardy. The first bids were just too high for the Finance 
Minister.
As well. Premier Robichaud had recommended that a full 
review be conducted. He would rather swallow the costs of 
the approaches now than face far greater financial burdens 
and embarrassments later. Ottawa agreed, and on June 30, 
1967, the Minister of Public Works, George Mcllraith, 
indicated that the first tendering had been rejected because 
the bids had come in far higher than the government had 
anticipated/" The cost, originally estimated at $150 
million, was now expected to reach as much as $320 
m i l l i o n . i n  light of these figures, the federal 
government decided to reassess the design of the permanent 
connection. The P.E.I. legislature unanimously protested 
this decision of Ottawa. A resolution was passed stating, 
"that the Federal Government be requested to give this 
matter immedia ^ c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I t  was further 
resolved by the House of Assembly that "there must be no 
delay in proceeding with both the current phase and future 
phases of the project."” However, the fact was that the
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link was not a part of the federal government's budgetary 
plans after it came to power. Before long the people who 
doubted the funding of the scheme would be proved correct.
It was the federal authority who determined the fate of the 
project.
Island representatives argued that a fixed connection 
would close the economic gap between P.E.I., which had the 
lowest per capita earnings, and the other Canadian 
provinces.’® On August 23, 1967, Premier Alex Campbell 
added that better transportation would increase farm output 
by 300%.” The federal government was accused of not 
fulfilling the terms of union; and according to an Island 
member of the House of Commons, "I suggest that this 
causeway has been a political football for too long, and for 
too long have we suffered by reason of the fact that the 
causeway has been made a political football..."®“
One Island MP, David MacDonald, a Tory from Prince 
county, argued that the entire project was purely political 
and had been the pawn of federal and provincial election 
campaigns. The link continued to be a tool used by 
members of one party to attack the credibility of the 
others. Those in power said they would build the link 
immediately, while whoever was in opposition seized upon 
every moment to criticize alleged inaction.®® For example, 
the member from Prince, P.E.I., stated, "I want to look at 
the project not so much from the political point of view but
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from the point of view of its significance to the people of 
Prince Edward Island, and the way it has received such sorry 
treatment, particularly at the hands of the present 
government. Indeed, the difficulties and realities of 
P.E.I.'s transportation infrastructure took a back seat to 
the politics of the link.
Past examples were tabled in the House of Commons in 
October, 1967, in order to demonstrate the degree of 
political involvement with the fixed link before a federal 
election, and the subsequent reaction after an election.
Mary McQuaid, MP from Queens, stated that before the 1965 
election:
...the governmei.. sent down the master of them all, the 
then minister of transport. He is a man who in 
opposition always championed the cause of the people of 
Prince Edward Island, but who when he joined the 
government was not listened to so attentively. However, 
the then minister of transport ran up and down the 
Island like a dog looking for a telephone pole. 
Everywhere he stopped he assured the people that the 
causeway would be built. Then in October 1965, exactly 
one month before the election, he said in Kensington 
that there would be no further hold-ups. Mark that Mr. 
Chairman--no further hold-ups.**
She also declared that the causeway was forgotten in 
1965 because no liberal members were returned from P.E.I., 
and that it was only revived at election time.®* Some 
members accused the project of being "on" one day and "off" 
another, while others more blatantly referred to the link as 
a give-away program to buy votes.*®
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The federal government did not want to kill the project 
outright in 1967, if only for image and political reasons.
An election was likely in 1968. A considerable amount of 
money had already been spent on building the approach roads 
in the Jourimain Island area. In view of the costs, 
however, Ottawa announced plans not to postpone but to 
reschedule the project. Colonel Edward Churchill, the 
director of Expo “67, was appointed on August l, 1967 to 
review the engineers' plans and cost figures.®’ By placing 
a reputable individual in charge, the federal government 
could take credit for breathing new life into the 
project.** There was, however, no study of environmental 
impact or a realistic regional economic impact assessment. 
The issue was purely the cost of construction.
Meanwhile, in P.E.I., there had been a change in 
government in 1966. The young Liberal leader, Alexander B. 
Campbell, led his party to victory promising a new, modern 
image for the Island. He watched with interest as the 
federal government tiptoed around the issue of the often 
promised causeway. Campbell was especially interested in 
the report of Edward Churchill, delivered in Charlottetown 
in October, 1967. In his talk, Churchill addressed such 
variables as tides and currents, wind and waves, and ice 
conditions.** He emphasized the urgent need for a fixed 
crossing, and the general benefits that a link would accrue 
to P.E.I. and Atlantic Canada. Churchill suggested a
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revised design which would include highway and rail 
facilities. Premier Campbell agreed. He firmly believed 
that the province would only be interested in a design which 
provided for rails.®"
Churchill concluded that the costs, while high, would 
be recuperated within fifty years of the causeway's 
completion. But Ottawa said little. After all, an election 
had been called for June, 1968.
The federal election represented a crucial juncture in 
the demise of the fixed link project. Lester Pearson had 
passed leadership of the Liberal Party over to the 
charismatic federalist from Quebec, Pierre E. Trudeau. 
Although Trudeau spoke of the "Just society," the equalizing 
of economic opportunity and ending regional disparity, he 
had his doubts about the causeway plan and its so-called 
benefits. During the election, Trudeau sidestepped 
questions about whether construction of the causeway would 
continue. However, once securely elected with a majority, 
Trudeau felt more confident about shelving the project.
Trudeau wasted no time. In March 1969, he announced 
that the bulldozers had been silenced.®^ In its place,
Ottawa negotiated with Premier Campbell for a new economic 
revitalization plan for his province, a multi-million dollar 
scheme known as the Development Plan. According to the 
terms of the plan, the federal government proposed to spend 
$225 million over a 15 year period, in order to improve the
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Island economy and upgrade the ferry service.** Trudeau 
promised to build large modern terminal buildings at Cape 
Tormentine and Borden to accommodate tourists and truckers 
in comfort while they waited for the ferries. The reasons 
for abandoning the mega-project were summed up by Trudeau in 
the House of Commons on March 5, 1969:
...there is a limitation to the resources of Canada and 
a decision therefore had to be made fixing the 
priorities of expenditure. Following consultation with 
the government of Prince Edward Island, a decision was 
taken by the federal government to support the 
development plan as being the likeliest method of 
offering appreciable and lasting benefit to the economy 
of Prince Edward Island in the foreseeable future..."
The prime minister defended his position by maintaining 
that the decision was based on cost; the ferry service was 
cheaper than building a causeway." Although Trudeau 
indicated that the P.E.I. government was consulted, the 
federal authority was responsible for the project and had 
determined its fate. According to Trudeau, "...that decision 
was ours. We are the ones who decided not to proceed with 
the causeway."**
Predictably, the federal Conservatives criticized the 
Liberals for stopping the project. The opposition leader, 
Robert Stanfield, chastised Trudeau's Liberal government for 
breaking a promise made by a previous federal 
administration." The Campbell government in P.E.I. 
unsuccessfully asked for a review of the decision, and
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continued to push for the project on the premise that there 
was still a great deal of support for a link in the 
province.®’ According to the M.P. from Egmont, David 
MacDonald, "...the people of P.E.I. are unanimous in their 
desire to see it completed..."®* MacDonald may have 
exaggerated the degree of support, but for many the fixed 
connection was regarded as a way to provide greater 
opportunity to solve regional disparity.®® Others, 
however, feared that such a mega-project would only increase 
Island dependency on Ottawa. Premier Campbell, in his 
active promotion of a link, was charged with displaying in 
its extreme form "the Maritime Syndrome--the tendency to 
look to the federal government to solve all problems, or at 
least pay for solving t h e m . A s  of 1969, $15 million had 
been spent on the causeway.
Aside from the political accusations, there was no 
indication of popular discontent in P.E.I. after the project 
was discontinued. Similarly, on the other side of the 
Northumberland Strait, the reaction in New Brunswick was one 
of indifference. There, Premier Louis Robichaud stated that 
virtually nobody noticed or cared about the decision, and 
there was virtually no reaction at all in the New Brunswick 
legislature.^* Perhaps Ottawa was right, the scheme really 
did not make sense and certainly did not affect votes.
Every federal and provincial government throughout the 
1950s and 1960s had promised the causeway. Since the
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project was either stalled or rejected by each federal 
government regardless of party affiliation, the scheme 
tended to become a persistent source of tension in federal- 
provincial relations. Premiers, Liberal and Conservative, 
were frustrated by federal indecision and political- 
electoral expediency. All agreed that from a political 
perspective the time was right in the mid 1960s to close the 
economic gap between a have-not province and the rest of 
Canada through the use of financing mega-projects that would 
provide updated infrastructure and create much needed 
employment. Yet, the federal government abandoned the 
causeway project in 1969 because it became convinced that a 
causeway was not economically viable or advisable. The 
highly inflated bids on the first section of the causeway 
were an indicator that the technology was not there at a 
reasonable cost in the 1960s. Even the proponents admitted 
that it was a massive undertaking from an engineering point 
of view. Technology to build super structures could not 
keep up with politicians' promises and public 
expectations
Although there was little local dissatisfaction over 
the decision not to proceed with the causeway, a few Island 
companies and individuals persisted in promoting the idea. 
But the truth was that politically it was a dead issue. The 
decision was made by the federal government and P.E.I. had 
to accept it. The causeway proposal idea lingered in
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people's minds for only a short period before it fizzled out 
with little more than a whimper.
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CHAPTER 4 
1985-1995
After the Development Plan was implemented in 1970, the 
fixed link debate faded into the background until 1985.
There were relatively few developments in the ferry service 
during the fifteen year period. The John Hamilton Gray was 
the last vessel to be added to the fleet, although a new, 
modern vessel would replace the ageing Abeaweit. Changes 
were occurring in other sectors of the transportation 
industry in the mid 1980s, such as the airline industry. 
Local commuter airlines like Air Atlantic and Air Nova, 
connecting with the major carriers, were being introduced. 
Although such measures made travel in Atlantic Canada more 
convenient than ever, air travel continued to be an 
expensive mode of transportation and did little to alleviate 
congestion at the ferry terminals.
In the federal election of 1984 Canadians ousted the 
Liberals. The voters had enough of constitutional 
wrangling, federal-provincial bickering, recession and 
inflation. The Conservative leader, Brian Mulroney promised 
a new age of fiscal restraint with reason, economic growth 
and amiable federal-provincial negotiations. As far as 
Islanders were concerned, he made little or no mention about 
a fixed link for the province. Nevertheless, Islanders 
showed their faith in the Conservatives by electing three 
MPs to sit in Mulroney'8 government.
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Although Mulroney had made no promises with respect to 
a fixed link in the election, during the following four to 
five years he became more interested in such a project. The 
Tories launched a cost cutting program that involved civil 
service downsizing, higher taxes and privatization. One 
area that was directly affected was transportation. The 
government forced the railways, in particular, to reduce the 
number of active routes and to privatize. Much the same was 
true for the airline industry. Deregulation and 
privatization became the buzz words of the new age. In 
keeping with this mood, an unnamed private sector consortium 
approached the federal government in the mid 1980s with a 
fixed link idea as a way to eliminate the federal 
government's subsidy to the ferry service. Ottawa was 
intrigued with this plan, seeing in it an excellent 
possibility of promoting its hopes to encourage large scale 
private investment at work for the good of all Canadians at 
a minimum of risk to the taxpayer's dollar. Therefore, 
Ottawa agreed to support the proposal, whereby a private 
company or consortium would finance, build and operate the 
project for a pre-determined number of years, at the end of 
which time ownership would pass to Ottawa. In return, the 
developer would receive a subsidy equivalent to the cost of 
operating the ferries as well as all the toll revenues.
The federal government's interest in this version of 
the fixed link scheme raises an interesting question; why
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would the federal government be sympathetic to the idea of 
placing a project of such magnitude in the hands of the 
private sector in the 1980s, while it had so vehemently 
opposed it in the 1960s? The answer lies in a major shift 
in the federal government's political agenda and approach to 
regional economic development. The Conservative 
administration's economic plans involved reducing federal 
transfers, cutting services and turning over the 
responsibility for the funding of infrastructure programs, 
such as the fixed link, to private companies. Unlike the 
Liberal regime of the past that had favoured federal 
government control over federally funded programs. Crown 
corporations, and federal economic initiatives, the Tories 
set out on an agenda of privatization. By doing so, Ottawa 
would theoretically be off the financial hook. Contractors 
would assume the economic risks and Ottawa would be better 
able to control its debt and deficit situations.
Notwithstanding this "favourable climate" for free 
enterprise, Ottawa remained at the controls. The private 
developer would be chosen by Ottawa. Also, the company 
would have to conform to the rules set out by the federal 
government. Clearly Ottawa would remain in place, as 
always, to control the project and stop it if need be. 
Ottawa, not the contractor, would determine the design of 
the project, although companies bidding for the contract 
^ould make recommendations as to whether they would build a
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bridge, a tunnel, a causeway or some combination of the 
three. Although the link was supposedly being built for 
Islanders, at their request, they would have no advance say 
in what model they preferred. That Ottawa would know what 
was best, was the implication. At no point would those who 
would most benefit from the link have a say in what kind of 
proposal would best suit their needs. The federal 
government had always made the final decision on the 
political and economic viability of the project. It had 
made the ultimate decision on whether or not the project 
proceeded. Politics killed the project in the past and 
politics could kill it in the future.
While in the late 1980s there was a fair amount of talk 
about a fixed link project actually being realized this 
time, many were sceptical. Ottawa did not seem to be as 
concerned about vessel capacity and increases in traffic to 
and from P.E.I., as it was in meeting its political 
objectives. As in the time of Senator Howlan and that of 
Prime Minister Diefenbaker, politics fuelled the debate.
In fact, ironically this time, there was probably more 
interest in the fixed link in Ottawa than there was in 
P.E.I. After all, Islanders' scepticism was fuelled by the 
sight of the now overgrown rail and road bed approaches to a 
non-existent causeway that had been cut through the scrub of 
Jourimain Island in 1968. These were visible reminders of 
just how quickly a project could be terminated by the
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federal government no matter what the voters wanted. And, 
theie were more and more people who were beginning to 
question not only the cultural and economic wisdom of the 
fixed link, but also the environmental and safety 
advisability of such a scheme. Although speaking in 1993, 
Chris Axworthy voiced the thoughts of many even a decade 
before, "The fixed link is being portrayed as being 
something that Prince Edward Islanders want. If we look at 
the question that was asked Prince Edward Islanders 
regarding the transportation issue between the Island and 
the mainland, we will see that it is by no means clear that 
this fixed link is what Islanders chose.
Once again, fixed link fever seemed to coincide with 
election fever. On the eve of the 1988 federal election, 
Ottawa suddenly became more aggressive in its fixed link 
rhetoric. Mulroney needed to convince Canadians that 
privately contracted mega-projects would work. Senator 
George Van Roggen hit the nail on the head when he claimed 
in November, 1987, that it was uncanny how in years gone by 
the announcements relative to the fixed crossing, "preceded 
by only a matter of weeks a federal or provincial 
election."* Van Roggen was moved to make this comment 
following the announcement by the Public Works Minister and 
MP from Halifax, Stewart Mclnnes, that his department was 
preparing to put out a call for tenders to build the fixed 
link. Mclnnes estimated the cost of $900 million, borne
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largely by the winning contractor, would create about 2,000 
direct and indirect jobs and bring another $125,000 annually 
to P.E.I.'8 economy during the construction period.^ 
Islanders were not hoodwinked by this seemingly 
magnanimous gesture. Ottawa had not suddenly admitted the 
need to meet its constitutional obligations. A columnist 
from the Eastern Graphic gave a critical, but accurate, 
description of the politics surrounding the fixed crossing 
when he stated that, "It has everything to do with a 
political party desperately looking for a massive job 
creation project to lift the region out of the current 
depression in time for the election soon to come.
Indeed, the timing was right for a make work project for 
P.E.I. As one federal politician put it, [I am] "just trying 
to protect the environment and create jobs for Islanders."® 
The future of the link depended on whether or not Ottawa 
approved the private proposals submitted by the contractors 
when the tendering process was over.®
Although Ottawa had its own agenda fuelling the fixed 
link scheme. Environment Minister Tom McMillan did think it 
would be wise to determine how much local opposition there 
might be to this plan. If the majority of Islanders were 
opposed, then perhaps Ottawa would have to work on public 
relations before it sent in the bulldozers. A provincial 
plebiscite was called for January 18, 1988. Carefully 
timed, it preceded the federal election of that year. The
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plebiscite was simply worded and asked Islanders if they 
supported a permanent link to New Brunswick. The various 
sides quickly took shape. In the end almost 60% of 
Islanders voted in favour of supporting construction of a 
fixed link although they had no idea what form it might 
take, but in principle the majority of Islanders wanted a 
fixed link.’ With this kind of local support for the 
scheme, the federal government was now in a position to push 
ahead with the project on the premise that it had the 
support of Islanders, even though the plebiscite was pre­
mature, obscurely worded, and a design proposal was 
undetermined at that time.
Although the proposals submitted by the contractors 
included bridge, highway and rail tunnel options, Public 
Works Canada limited the field of choices by excluding the 
rail tunnel design proposal. The rail tunnel option was not 
favoured because the federal government wanted out of the 
rail business.* This was not a new idea. Ottawa was 
suspected of wanting to pursue that end back in the 1960s 
when the question of rail service across the Strait was 
debated. The proposal for a road tunnel was shunned by 
federal government engineers because they believed it to be 
impracticable and costly, in spite of the report of a 
governmental study undertaken by Max Perchanok in 1988 which 
revealed that a tunnel was cleaner (during construction), 
safer and more environmentally sound than a bridge design.®
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The French and English might tackle the "Chunnel," but 
Canadians would opt for a bridge. Long gone were the days 
of Senator Howlan's support for a tunnel. Interestingly 
enough, aside from the Perchanok study, there was never any 
formal evaluation conducted to compare the advantages and 
disadvantages of the various design proposals.
In the wake of the plebiscite the various sides of the 
issue became more clearly defined. For many the plebiscite 
was simply regarded as a vote in principle, not a vote in 
favour of anything specific. After all, they were not aware 
of the specifics in January, 1988. But as the specifics 
began to emerge so the various opinions became more pointed. 
For every new detail of the plan that emerged there were 
proponents and opponents. When Ottawa indicated that it 
favoured a bridge over a tunnel, proponents said that a 
bridge would create many new jobs and provide the fastest 
most efficient link. Meanwhile, opponents viewed it as a 
threat to Island culture, to the lucrative shellfish 
industry in the Strait and to shipping in the Strait."
The opponents emphasized that there was no evidence to 
suggest that a bridge would provide any more long term 
economic benefits than the ferry s e r v i c e . T h e y  were also 
concerned about the loss of employment among Marine Atlantic 
ferry workers. Indeed, the ferry service was and is an 
important part of the Island economy. Not only did it 
employ over 600 people directly, there was considerable
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spin-off employment in the service industry. The ferry 
service was also the "life-bread" of communities like 
Borden. An Island M.P. brought to the attention of the 
House of Commons that a permanent connection to the mainland 
was not a prelude to economic p r o s p e r i t y . I n  an 
interesting juxtaposition, he indicated that Cape Breton's 
unemployment rate was on par with that of Newfoundland and 
Prince Edward Island in 1986, even though a causeway had 
been built to link Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia."
Identifying the opponents was not always easy. It was 
complicated by a number of factors. Not all opponents to 
the bridge idea were in fact opponents to a fixed link in 
general. On the contrary, they wanted a link but they 
wanted either a highway or rail tunnel. Supporters of a 
link favoured different plans, yet often found themselves 
lumped in with the opponents to any link simply because they 
were opposing a particular kind of structure on the same 
grounds as those denouncing construction of any plans in 
general. Nevertheless, once it became clear that the 
federal government would only give serious consideration to 
a bridge plan, two identifiable groups emerged in the 
ensuing debate. On the pro-link side was the coalition 
known as “Islanders for a Better Tomorrow." On the anti­
link side was a group known as the “Friends of the Island." 
Both groups had been formed in 1987, a year before the 
plebiscite, but they gained strength afterwards.
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The proponents of the project, which included the 
federal government and Public Works Canada, saw the bridge 
as a way to jump-start the local economy. They believed 
that Maritime businesses, contractors and construction 
companies would gain employment and prosper during the 
development stage. The bridge opponents, however, noted 
that the scheme would provide only a minor and short term 
remedy to the economic woes of the region.
The "Friends" argued that a fixed connection would 
destroy the Island "way of life". In addition, they were 
concerned that a bridge, in particular, would create a whole 
new generation of delays and, as a result, would not fulfil 
the federal government's agreement to provide continuous and 
efficient communication. There was also concern among the 
opponents that engineering and construction companies, as 
well as others with a vested interest in the plan, were only 
seeking to make profits, and had little concern about Prince 
^Edward Islanders or their "way of life. The debate even 
took on international tones when some Japanese tourists 
expressed concern that a link would destroy the charm and 
mystique surrounding the Island and its associated fictional 
character, Anne of Green Gables.“ The opponents at home 
and abroad seemed to agree that a bridge would increase 
congestion and pollution, and permanently alter the 
provincial landscape.
Unlike the fixed link campaign in the 1960s, t.iHt of
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the 1980s and 1990s focused on how such a structure would 
encourage tourism. Dreams of industrial greatness, so 
prevalent in the Sixties had been tempered by reality. 
Irving and Wardell were no longer around dreaming of the 
Atlantic Centre. In some ways, container-ship port 
development in Halifax and Saint John had seen to that, 
Instead, the new panacea for regional disparity seemed to be 
tourism. Large scale tourism operators and promoters in 
P.E.I. regarded the fixed link as absolutely essential if 
tourists were to flock to the Island paradise.
Of course, opponents to the scheme also tended to fear 
such forecasted tourist invasions. They saw a permanent 
link as a "tourism mega-project monster."" They also saw 
it as the brainchild of those mainland profiteers who wanted 
to drain financial resources from the Island. As Kenneth A. 
MacKinnon observed in 1992:
Of course the real project beneficiaries will not 
be local tourist operators but mainland developers 
and construction companies and the Moncton area 
service economy... Investment in processing would 
remain by no means certain because it would be 
very tempting to export raw product in those empty 
tractor trailers returning to the mainland..
Opponents also feared that Islanders' loyalty to their 
own local businesses would not be strong enough to resist 
the easy access to Moncton and Halifax. Of course, 
proponents pointed out that the link would mean more and
99
cheaper goods would be available in the Island stores if 
Islanders stayed at home. But, opponents painted a very 
negative picture of life in P.E.I. after the causeway, 
Proponents painted the opposite. Opponents said the bridge 
would not be safe due to wind sheer factors. The proponents 
said it would be safe, if not safer, than the ferries. One 
group said that tolls to cross the bridge would become 
exorbitant in order to cover costs, while the other group 
claimed the tolls would be the same as ferry fares. 
Proponents praised the federal government for finally 
listening to the demands of Islanders. Opponents criticized 
the provincial government for ignoring the future welfare of 
Islanders :
...the Prince Edward Island government is not 
being responsible to those who have a stake in the 
traditional economy by failing to demand that an 
upgraded efficient ferry service be given a chance 
to prove its potential for regenerating the 
economy. The high-risk move to a bridge is a 
shifting of the province's crucial economic 
balance from the slow-growth areas of an 
indigenous resource and service sector to the 
unpredictable gamble of mass tourism, the 
prospects and benefits of which have been wildly 
exaggerated...“
In June, 1988, eight fixed link proposals were 
announced in Charlottetown. The Mulroney government thought 
this would convince Islanders of his government's sincerity 
and ensure Island votes in the upcoming election. However, 
by then, many Islanders who had voted yes in January were
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now questioning their decision, and were seriously 
reassessing their support for a fixed link, especially one 
built with little or no attention being paid to Island needs 
and ideas. As well. Islanders, like many Maritimers, were 
none too impressed with the Conservative government's other 
social and economic programs and policies. Supporting the 
fixed link was no guarantee for a politician that he or she 
would get re-elected. That was what Tom McMillan, a strong 
pro-link advocate and MP for Hillsborough, and Public Works 
Minister Stewart Mclnnes learned. They both were defeated, 
as were all four Tories in P.E.I. Mulroney won a resounding 
victory in 1988 but not in Atlantic Canada. Many Islanders 
were uncertain about the nature of the government's 
involvement with the fixed link scheme. Others were 
sceptical that Ottawa was serious.” Still others simply 
distrusted the Tories or objected to the fixed link on 
cultural, economic, historical and environmental grounds.
Conservative failures in Prince Edward Island did not 
lead the Mulroney government to terminate its plans for the 
bridge link. On the contrary, things continued to move 
ahead buoyed by the support of the Island business 
community. Among those supporting a bridge were the P.E.I. 
branch of the Manufacturing Association, the P.E.I. Potato 
Producers Association, the Tourist Industry Association of 
P.E.I., the Construction Association, the P.E.I. Council of 
Trade, the various Boards of Trade throughout the Maritimes
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and the P.E.I, Trucker's Association.** All these 
interests had long talked of the need for faster, more 
dependable land transportation of Island products. As the 
truckers noted, a bridge would remove those delays at the 
ferry terminals which always reduced profit per load.**
For the trucking companies, potato producers and Island 
manufacturers the bridge, or any fixed link for that matter, 
would enhance their incomes and mean better service for 
Island agricultural products and primary and secondary 
industries .**
The support expressed by the truckers and some of the 
other proponents was not, however, unconditional. For 
instance, the P.E.I. Truckers Association agreed with the 
fishers that the environmental impact should be fully 
assessed before proceeding,** The fishers argued that 
while they opposed a bridge, they did not oppose a tunnel. 
They believed it would have the least negative impact on 
their industry.^ But a tunnel was not part of Ottawa's 
plan, and these views were never adequately considered.*® 
Instead, politicians at the federal and provincial levels 
gave assurances that the bridge project would be of minimal 
risk to the environment, both in terms of damage to the sea 
bed and possible shipping accidents resulting from the 
placement of bridge supports.
The environmental issue, however, would not go away 
easily. Unlike the arguments about the effects on the
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Island way of life or the long term real fiscal costs, the 
environmental concerns seemed to be something about which 
even proponents of the scheme were concerned. Also, 
national environmentalists like David Suzuki were expressing 
fears about the possible damage to fish stocks, shellfish 
beds, seabird nesting areas and beaches. It became clear 
that this was one area of debate which Ottawa simply could 
not ignore.
Early in January, 1989, Ottawa announced that it would 
refer the fixed link project to an independent Environmental 
Assessment Panel for further study. The Panel, chaired by 
David H. Barnes, was appointed on April 28, 1989, and public 
hearings were held over the next two months. In a report 
released in the summer of 1990, the panellists recommended 
that the bridge project should not proceed. The Panel's 
recommendation was based largely on concerns that a bridge 
could potentially have a negative impact on the environment 
by causing ice-out delays in the Northumberland Strait. The 
report suggested that a road and rail tunnel would be far 
less threatening to the local environment.
Ironically, in spite of the Panel's findings, the 
federal government was intent on pushing ahead with the 
bridge proposal. It was not at all interested in starting 
the process all over again to find a consortium to build a 
tunnel. Instead, Ottawa decided to find someone who could 
convincingly refute the position of the Environmental
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Assessment Panel. In 1991, the federal government appointed 
another environmental study panel, headed by Ottawa engineer 
Dr. Ken Croasdale, to examine the effects that a bridge 
would have on ice conditions in the Strait. Only the 
question of ice conditions was to be addressed and it was 
clear Ottawa expected to receive a favourable response that 
would say ice would not be a problem.** The panel 
concluded that a 14km bridge between New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia would not seriously affect ice in the Northumberland 
Strait."
The Island's provincial Liberal government, in power 
since 1986, was anxious to see bridge construction begin. 
Therefore it announced that it was willing to support the 
federal government's decision to go-ahead with the project 
if certain conditions were met. These conditions, announced 
by the Island Premier Joe Ghiz, became known as Joe Ghiz's 
"ten commandments." Some of the conditions which had to be 
met included the continuation of the Wood Islands-Caribou 
ferry service, an upgrading of highways to handle increases 
in traffic, a cap on tolls, compensation to displaced 
workers and fishers and environmental concerns.
In reality Ghiz's "commandments" were not intended to 
terminate the project. Ghiz simply wanted to reassure 
Islander's that he too was concerned about the environmental 
and ecological implications of the bridge. If his concerns 
were satisfactorily addressed, then he believed Islanders
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should join him in endorsing the federal project. This was 
about as directly involved as the provincial government 
could and did become involved. No matter what "rules" Ghiz 
might lay down, the truth was that the federal government 
called all the shots. In fact, through the insistence of 
Ottawa, the Prince Edward Island legislature agreed to a 
constitutional amendment in 1953, which officially stated 
that the construction of a bridge would fulfil the 
confederation contract between the federal government and 
P.E.I."
Formal bids for bridge construction were received by 
Ottawa in 1992. The lowest bidding contractor, Calgary- 
based Strait Crossing Inc.(SCI), was selected as the winner. 
This company was a consortium consisting of three other 
(international) firms--Morrison-Knudson of Boise, Idaho, GTM 
Entrepose of France and Ballast Nedam of the Netherlands."
It is interesting to note that the president of SCI, Paul 
Giannelia, remained at the head of the project even though 
he sold most of SCI's shares to foreign investors in 
1993." This manoeuvre was not perceived by the federal 
government as being in violation of its agreement with SCI, 
because it viewed this refinancing as additional insurance 
that the project would be completed on schedule."
The bids were in, the winner was selected and Ottawa 
was ready to give the go ahead. But environmentalists, 
academics and people in general, wanted answers as to why
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other options, such as improved ferry service or a highway 
tunnel proposal, were not considered. The controversy 
culminated in the first anti-link book called Crossing that 
Bridge, which was edited by Lorraine Begley and published in 
1993, The book consisted of articles from twenty-one 
contributors, each contributing a critical look at the fixed 
link. In addition to addressing the federal government's 
reason for rejecting the tunnel option, the book also 
discussed the apparent discrepancies concerning the inflated 
subsidy the federal government granted to SCI, and the fate 
of the Wood Islands-Caribou ferry service. Begley's book 
gave strength to the anti-link community. It was clear that 
Ottawa never seriously looked at the tunnel idea because "it
was not a viable response to the requirements of the
proposal call.""
It was the subsidy issue which really attracted public 
attention in 1993. Ottawa had determined that the developer 
would receive a $42 million annual subsidy, yet this was 
almost double the amount of the subsidy that Marine Atlantic 
received." Many Islanders, like Begley, wanted to know 
how the federal government had determined the inflated 
figure, an amount to be given to the developer over a 35
year period. One contributor to the Begley book indicated
that the maximum life span of a bridge over the 
Northumberland Strait would be 100 years." Ownership 
would be transferred back to the federal government at mid
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point in the life span of the bridge, just when maintenance 
costs would start to rise significantly.
While Lorraine Begley's book made many Islanders even 
more suspicious about the project, local politicians were 
not deterred. Perhaps Ottawa held a carrot before them.
Joe Ghiz had resigned as Liberal Party leader and took with 
him his "ten commandments." His successor, Catherine 
Callback, was anxious to promote the project. She firmly 
believed it was the only way that Islanders could improve 
their economic position within the region, let alone the 
country/" Elected in 1993, she was thrilled to hear the 
announcements on October 8, 1993 that Ottawa was giving the 
official go-ahead." The fact that a federal election was 
held in that same month undoubtably accounted for the 
announcement. SCI promised the link would be a reality 
within five years."
The events of 1993 further reveal that the fixed link 
had been designated as a campaign issue. There was much 
debate about the link in the House of Commons in the early 
months of 1993. Debate over the bill to enact the 
Northumberland Strait Crossing Act (Bill C-110) was 
divisive, particularly between the Progressive 
Conservatives, who spoke highly of the mega project, and the 
New Democrats, who were very critical of the scheme. The 
Conservatives relied on many of the same arguments that had 
been used and re-used in the past in order to advance their
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cause. As in the 1960s, David Worthy, the Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Minister of Public Works, on February 22 
1993, indicated that the link was conceived as an important 
job creation project. He referred to the bridge as the 
Northumberland Strait one--two punch:
Punch No.l is that construction of this massive 
project will create jobs and business 
opportunities starting immediately and continuing 
through the next four or five years. Punch No.2 
will be that in the longer term, after the link i 
completed, it will enhance the province's growing 
tourism industry and will result in cost 
efficiencies for agriculture and many other 
enterprises. Construction itself is expected to 
generate from 3,500 to 4,000 person years of 
employment over the next five years.
Opponents noted that much of the work would be short 
term and seasonal and that many workers would again be 
unemployed after five years and during the winter season. 
Nevertheless, many of the politicians and proponents 
stressed that the opponents ignored the indirect jobs that 
would be created in the tourism and service industries, both 
during and after construction. They observed that once the 
bridge was completed, tourist traffic was estimated to 
increase permanently by 25%, and 2,000 seasonal jobs would 
be created/** Opponents quickly replied that in all 
probability, like most jobs in the service industry, many of 
these new jobs would be low paying and the actual number of 
jobs on the bridge itself will only be a fraction of the
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number of people presently employed in the ferry service.
A member of the NDP, Chris Axworthy (Saskatoon-Clark's 
Crossing), stated that the federal government was 
sacrificing hundreds of ferry positions for jobs that would 
only exist while the link is being built.*' He went on to 
recommend that the federal government place additional 
ferries on the run, which would both save ferry jobs and 
increase service/"
One of the most overt political attacks in the history 
of the fixed link debate occurred in the House of Commons on 
February 22, 1993--just before the federal election was 
called, David Barrett, NDP member f om Esquimalt--Juan de 
Fuca, stated that the fixed link was, "sheer vote buying at 
the stupidest level that one can think."*' He outwardly 
criticized the Conservative government for spending $42 
million a year to correct the problem of giving Marine 
Atlantic a $21 million subsidy.** As far as long term 
costs to the taxpayer were concerned, Barrett drew attention 
to the extensive maintenance costs of the Lions Gate Bridge 
in his home province of British Columbia, by saying that, 
"over 50 years they have probably replaced the capital value 
about five times in simple maintenance."" Politics being 
politics, both Barrett and NDP policy were ridiculed by the 
Conservatives. Nevertheless, the member from Esquimalt-Juan 
de Fuca persisted in stressing that the Tories were throwing 
money into the project in order to obtain votes in the
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Maritime region/® He challenged the government and the 
official Liberal opposition, led by Jean Chretien, to call 
in the Auditor general to study the subsidy issue/’
He also remarked that any Conservative holding office 
west of Manitoba, who wanted to remain in office, could not 
justify to the people of western Canada the inflated 
expenditure that the project developers would receive/® 
Barrett wanted to know why the government was pushing ahead 
with the project when it was not, he argued, an economically 
viable proposition for the rest of Canada, particularly the 
western provinces. The $42 million per annum over a 35 year 
period would pay for the projected cost of completion of the 
entire project. He declared that, "why should we pay a 
share of this dumb idea when we do not get a single penny 
for our transportation costs from the mainland of Vancouver 
to Vancouver Island?"®® Ironically the consortium planning 
to build the bridge was from Calgary.
The Hon. Doug Lewis, the Solicitor General of Canada, 
responded to Barrett's tirade, arguing that the agreement 
with P.E.I. was based on the need to fulfil a constitutional 
contract, and that the province was guaranteed permanent 
year round access to the mainland when it entered the 
union.®* The Solicitor General also claimed that Ottawa's 
most outstanding problem with respect to fulfilling its 
constitutional obligations was the delays connected with 
waiting.®! To Barrett, he shot back, "In your party you
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maybe do not have to wait for ferries but in our party you 
do."®=
To Islanders back home this exchange must have seemed 
rather strange--two non Maritimers telling each other what 
was and what was not best for P.E.I. In fact, Barrett 
opposed the scheme because it seemed to be a lot of money 
being spent in an economically peripheral province. Lewis 
supported the scheme because it was part of government 
policy. The whole constitutional argument was little more 
than a justification useful in 1993 but not in earlier days. 
Ottawa had not really experienced a great revelation of its 
obligations, it had simply found an old argument that would 
justify its own actions and would please the Island's 
premier.
In fact, the long delays of 5-8 hours that Doug Lewis 
alluded to were a reality of the 1960s and 1970s, but not 
the 1990s. The delays of the 1990s were usually minor and 
confined to stormy weather and to the peak tourist season of 
July and August. Although the demise of the railway in the 
Maritimes in the 1980s had resulted in a substantial 
increase in truck traffic, the ferry service had also been 
expanded. Modern vessels including the Abeaweit II (1984) 
and the Confederation II (1993) had been introduced. Both 
had larger capacities for handling motor and transport 
vehicles than previous ferries. Also, in the early 1970s 
modern terminals had been built at either end of the ferry
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run. These included food, washroom, telephone, picnic and 
playground facilities. Space for waiting had been greatly 
enlarged and methods of loading the vessels markedly 
improved.
The ferry service of the early 1990s was a far cry from 
that of the 1900s and 1960s. It was much more efficient and 
could cope effectively with traffic increases and most ice 
conditions. Because P.E.I. is separated from New Brunswick 
by 14km of open sea-water, some form of delay was inevitable 
no matter what mode of communication was employed, whether 
it be by a bridge, tunnel or ferry service. The fixed link 
options might decrease the number of delays, but they would 
not completely eliminate them. Consider, for instance, that 
in Crossing That Bridge, reference is made to a bridge of 
similar design in the United States, where the speed limit 
is very low (30 KPH) even in ideal weather conditions."
The bridge did not emerge as a central campaign issue 
in the months preceding the 1993 federal election. A deal 
to proceed with the project had already been signed between 
Ottawa, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island on December 
16, 1992." The Conservative government continued to push 
ahead with the bridge project in what proved to be its final 
months in office. Although the Liberal leader, John 
Chretien, did not make any significant pre-election 
announcements concerning his party's position with respect 
to the $950 million project, a few Maritime Liberal
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candidates endorsed the bridge plan. The Liberal MP from 
Halifax, Mary Clancy, for instance, announced in the House 
of Commons on June 14, 1993, that a bridge would not only 
reduce delays at the terminals, but would create much needed 
jobs in the Maritimes." In her opinion, immediate job 
creation was the greatest asset of the project.
The local provincial government supported the federal 
Liberals and reassured bridge supporters that if elected, 
Chretien would not terminate the project. They were 
correct. Following its landslide victory in October, 1993, 
the Liberal government voiced its support for the bridge.
The government, determined to reduce the federal deficit, 
set about slashing unnecessary federal spending, scrapping 
projects like the multi-million dollar Tory initiated 
helicopter purchase plan. But the bridge to P.E.I. somehow 
remained protected from the chopping block. Bridge 
construction continued because the Liberals, like the 
Conservatives, were attracted to the promises of large scale 
job creation. They also believed that the private nature of 
the funding protected the federal government and the 
Canadian taxpayer from large scale cost overruns. Just 
months after his election, in April 1994, Chretien expressed 
his enthusiasm for the project, praising it as a reflection 
of modern realities."
The concepts of privatization and deregulation were 
trends that became part and parcel of federal political
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agendas for both the Liberals and Conservatives in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, Public services, which were 
traditionally funded by the federal government, increasingly 
were placed in private hands when at all possible or else 
they were eliminated. Such may be the future of all ferry 
service in the Atlantic region. The bridge may very well 
actually replace the ferry service between Nova Scotia and 
P.E.I., as well as that between New Brunswick and the 
Island. Lorraine Begley maintains that with the completion 
of the bridge, Ottawa will probably downsize and then 
abolish the seasonal Wood Islands-Caribou ferry service."
The extent to whirh the bridge was a federal government 
project and decision was evident in the financial strategy 
for construction set out by Ottawa. The successful 
engineering consortium had to establish a trust fund in 
order to comply with Ottawa's economic terms. This approach 
was viewed by the federal government as an additional way to 
protect Canadians from cost overruns and delays. SCI agreed 
to raise 70% of the required sum in the international bond 
market. Equity investment would supposedly cover 15% and 
interest on the remainder of the balance would provide an 
additional 15%." The federal government transferred the 
responsibility of funding to the private sector through a 
program called BOT, meaning Build, Own and Transfer. In 
other words, the bridge would be constructed, owned and 
operated by a private company for a period of 35 years.
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After that period, ownership would pass to the federal 
government who, in turn, would assume operating costs and 
control.
In the meantime, however, the contractor would receive 
an annual government subsidy of $42 million and all toll 
booth revenues. The toll booth take was estimated to 
provide between $16 and $20 million per year.®* Although 
the initiative came from private enterprise, the federal 
government controlled the details of the project and made 
all the decisions concerning funding. For example, Ottawa 
had indicated that toll increases over the 35 year period 
would not be allowed to exceed 75% of the consumer price 
index.®® Yet, ironically, since Ottawa had agreed to pay 
out the cost of the bridge in subsidies over a 35 year 
period, one might wonder how that differed from state 
controlled investment. For some it might appear to actually 
contradict the expressed policy of privatization. The Globe 
and Mail reported that the project was being billed as a 
private sector project, even though it was going to be 
entirely paid for by the federal government.
Construction on the bridge continued throughout 1994 
and into the early part of 1995, although on a much smaller 
scale in the winter months. The work is still in the 
preliminary stages and is expected to peak over the next two 
summers. Although safety precautions have been emphasized 
by the federal government and the consortium, there have
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been mishaps. A recent death and a couple of near 
fatalities have placed a dark cloud over the entire project. 
So too have problems with the quality of poured concrete 
being used. In addition, some minor structural damage has 
occurred during storms in the early part of winter, 1994-95, 
partly owing to structural weaknesses in the support 
columns. In spite of the mishaps, it looks as though the 
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CONCLUSION
Although a wide cross section of people from 
businessmen to bureaucrats, from ferry workers to fishers 
have been involved in the debate regarding a fixed link 
connection between Prince Edward Island and mainland Canada, 
the federal authority ultimately determined what happened 
with the fixed link. This is perhaps not surprising since 
under the terms of its entry into confederation, P.E.I. had 
received a constitutional guarantee that continuous year 
round communication would be maintained by Ottawa between 
the mainland and the Island. A link of some kind, fixed or 
otherwise, was a federal responsibility. But what was 
surprising was that at no juncture since 1873 did the people 
of Prince Edward Island, those with the most vested interest 
in such a scheme, ever really control the nature or fate of 
the project. Even when a private company was selected to 
build a bridge in the 1990s, the federal government 
controlled the formula for the financing, design and 
operation of the project. For instance, in 1991, Ottawa not 
only determined that the design would incorporate a bridge 
and that no consideration would be given to a tunnel or a 
more sophisticated ferry service, but it also demanded all 
kinds of security from the developers, making it clear that 
Ottawa was not willing to make any financial commitments of 
its own.i As was the case back in the 1880s when the 
Northumberland Straits Tunnel Railway Company was
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incorporated by Ottawa, in the 1990s, whatever company 
received the go-ahead from the federal government to build a 
bridge/causeway had to meet the criteria set out by Ottawa, 
not by Island farmers, merchants, tourist operators or 
fishers.
Serious discussion within political circles of a fixed 
connection dates back to 1885 when Senator Howlan first 
advocated construction of a metal tube subway on the floor 
of the Northumberland Strait. In the century that followed, 
the topic surfaced, died and resurfaced almost in step with 
the coming and going of election campaigns, both federal and 
provincial. Generally until the mid 1960s, various 
political parties would at one election time or another 
commit themselves to researching, financing and building the 
link. Once the election had passed they would announce that 
they now thought it wiser to reconsider their support, 
perhaps even withdraw it altogether. Proponents and 
opponents alike, in the wake of an election, usually 
preferred to push for better ferry service than for a costly 
fixed connection. Nevertheless, the moment the ferry 
service let people down or whenever the next election was 
called, talk of a permanent communication link across the 
Northumberland Strait resurfaced.
It was a conspicuous "political football." For 
instance, it was used by John A. Macdonald on the eve of the 
1887 election, to divert attention away from the federal
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government's failure to fulfil the communication contract of 
the British North America Act.̂ Almost one hundred years 
later, another Conservative federal government decided to 
go-ahead with a bridge because it suited Tory plans to 
promote privately funded mega-projects. In both instances, 
Islanders were never seriously consulted. Even though a 
plebiscite was held in 1989 and the fixed link received a 
narrow margin of support, the truth was that Islanders 
really had no idea for what they were voting. The P.E.I. 
House of Assembly had virtually no say in the nature of the 
project either.
Ottawa cared little whether Island politicians believed 
the project should be state supported or privately funded. 
Why should they, Ottawa reasoned? Ottawa was responsible 
constitutionally for the communication link, not 
Charlottetown. This was even true in the 1960s when the 
provinces assumed the costs of building the land connections 
to the water crossing. How the federal government funded 
the latter was not a provincial concern, even if Ottawa 
should withdraw after the provinces had expended millions on 
preliminary construction. In the 1960s, Ottawa reasoned 
that the project was of too great importance to be placed in 
private hands. However, in the 1990s, it changed its mind. 
The project would be privatized. It was Ottawa's choice, 
not that of the Islanders and their local politicians; 
albeit, everything was subject to strict federal
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supervision. The project went from being state supported to 
privately funded because of changes in political philosophy 
and agenda within federal government ranks. In the era 
which brought Diefenbaker and Pearson to power, for 
instance, the fixed link mega-project was conceived as part 
of their administration's equalization agendas in which 
funds from the have regions would be transferred to the 
have-not regions. The federal governments of the late 1980s 
and 1990s, however, wanted to move away from equalization 
subsidies and to cut government spending, while at the same 
time, creating jobs and economic growth where possible. So 
it was that the idea of eliminating the historical annual 
subsidy for the operation of the ferry service to P.E.I. 
began to gain popularity in the Conservative Party and talk 
of supporting a privatized fixed link project became a 
reality.
Through the century of debate, relations between 
Islanders and the federal government have often been 
strained. On the one hand. Islanders and their 
representatives have at various times given a very specific 
interpretation to the British North America Act.
Historically many have argued that P.E.I. has a right to a 
truly permanent, dependable and efficient line of 
communication and transportation across the Northumberland 
Strait. To them that meant some form of fixed connection.
On the other hand, generally, the federal government has
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interpreted the clause to mean that Ottawa must provide a 
form of communication link which is as dependable and 
efficient as economic circumstances and technology allow. 
Similarly, Islanders have been frustrated by Ottawa's 
tendency to raise hopes, to leave them hanging and then to 
dash them. They cannot count on Ottawa fulfilling its 
promises. And, they are not consulted about what they want 
and need. Ironically, Ottawa seemed most inclined to push 
ahead with the link when local opposition to the plan was 
most vocal and organized and least inclined to support the 
plan when Islanders were most enthusiastic.
The people of P.E.I. also resent the fact that they 
have little real political clout in Ottawa and therefore 
must often conclude that there is no sense in fighting a 
federal decision. It is better to accept whatever 
appeasement is offered than to lash out at the hand that 
feeds one. Therein probably lies the hardest thing of all 
for Islanders to accept about their historical and present 
relationship with the federal government. The fixed link 
does not symbolize the individuality, pride and autonomy of 
an equal partner in confederation, but rather the dependence 
of a small, economically depressed province on a distant 
central authority. It is therefore, little wonder that the 
handling of the fixed link project by Ottawa has 
occasionally resulted in tensions in federal-provincial 
relations. Nevertheless, there have been periods of
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considerable mutual admiration and support, including the 
most recent period when Premiers Joe Ghiz and Catherine 
Callbeck have expressed their admiration of and gratitude to 
an understanding and responsive federal government, at least 
as far as the link project is concerned. In fact, in 1993, 
the P.E.I. House of Assembly supported a constitutional 
amendment which states that the fixed link when completed 
will fulfil Ottawa's obligation of providing continuous year 
round and efficient communication.
Interestingly enough, the basic arguments that have 
been advanced by the opponents and proponents of the project 
over the past 100 years have remained much the same. For 
the proponents, since the days of George Howlan, the 
arguments have included such issues as constitutional 
obligation, economic stimulation and user safety. All that 
has really changed is the emphasis or the nature of the 
economic stimulation argument. At one period proponents 
stressed how the link would promote better marketing of 
agricultural produce. Later they talked of industrial 
growth stimulation and more recently they have emphasized 
the expansion of the tourism industry.
Similarly, the opponents have historically stuck to 
such issues as quality of life, user safety, loss of jobs to 
ferry workers and the people of Borden, long term financial 
cost and environmental impact. For example, the people who 
have opposed the link, like the Brothers and Sisters of
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Cornelius Howatt and the "Friends of the Island." have 
always been concerned about preserving the Island "way of 
life." In fact, the emphasis and focus of the pro and con 
arguments have only shifted to reflect changes in 
technology, transportation development, population 
demographics, economic circumstances and fiscal philosophy. 
For instance, many of the modern day environmental concerns 
such as eco-system impact and ice-out delays, were not 
factors a century ago. Even Colonel Edward Churchill's 
report in the 1960s on the causeway was in no way comparable 
to the advanced environmental and economic assessments 
undertaken in the 1990s. Due to technological limitations, 
Howlan and Churchill had relied either on historical record, 
personal observation or professional speculation.
Ottawa had firm control over the outcome of the project 
from its inception, and continues in the 1990s to make the 
rules and act as adjudicator between the private company and 
the public. The federal government is in a position to 
ensure that the developer abides by Ottawa's regulations 
during the construction and operation phases. Such 
regulations include environmental controls, safety 
precautions and compensation to fishers. In 1994 Ottawa 
wielded its controlling hand when itrait Crossing Inc., the 
winning contractor for the bridge plan, initially held back 
some of the previously agreed upon compensation payments to 
the fishers. The federal government immediately intervened
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and demanded that the company uphold its end of the bargain 
or alternative measures would be employed, such as monetary 
confiscation by Ottawa.^
Even though bridge construction began in 1994, it 
remains to be seen if the project will ever be completed.
New problems can arise at any stage of construction and cost 
overruns are inevitable. Because private companies can go 
bankrupt, and governments generally do not, in a worst case 
scenario Ottawa may at some point down the line be forced to 
make a commitment and step in and take over the project 
whether it wants to or not. One cannot leave half a bridge 
in the Northumberland Strait. Nor can one leave a completed 
bridge without maintenance and supervision. Opponents may 
yet be proven to have been correct in their questioning of 
the financial stability of SCI. On February 23, 1995, one 
of the partners in the fixed link consortium, Morrison 
Knudson of Boise, Idaho, declared that it was on the brink 
of bankruptcy.'* As of that date, the company was seeking a 
cash infusion from its lenders to avoid filing for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy-court protection.® Although the company's 
financial woes were attributed to losses sustained in its 
failed rail division in the United States, such setbacks in 
the early stages of construction on the New Brunswick-P.E.I. 
bridge project serve as a grim reminder of the potential for 
financial disaster. If all goes as planned, however, the 
fixed link will become reality by the year 1997. Getting to
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and from Canada's smallest province will never be the same. 
A new era of permanent communication access with all its 
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Year Conservatives Liberals Conservatives Liberals
1878 142 64 1 5
1882 139 71 2 4
1887 126 89 0 6
1891 121 94 2 4
1896 88 118 3 2
1900 80 133 2 3
1904 75 138 3 1
1908 85 135 1 3
1911 134 87 2 2
1917 153 82 2 2
1953 51 171 1 3
1957 112 105 4 0
1958 208 49 4 0
1962 116 100 4 0
1963 95 129 2 2
1965 97 131 4 0
1968 72 155 4 0
1984 211 40 3 1
1988 169 82 0 4
1993 2 177 0 4
Sources: J. Murray Beck, Pendulum of Power (Scarborough
1968);E.R. Forbes and D.A. Muise (eds), The Atlantic 
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